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I. I NTRODUCTI ON 
A fundamenta l cha racteri s tic of the development of any 
science ls tha t its theori es y ield successively better 
approxima ti on s o f the true sta te of th in~s whi c h li e within 
its d omain . That is to say, a s its constituent the ori e s 
develope , the ir de flninp. ass umptions b e c ome l ess restrictinr , 
thus broadeninf the s e t of phenomena wh ich they may explain . 
Thus for example in phys i cs , we fi nd tha t Newton 's l a ws o f 
the unive rse, developed usin~ a Euclidean ~eometry, a nd the 
assumption of t he indepe ndence of time and spac e , ~ay explain 
the maj ority of t he physicsl pheno~ena wh ich ~ay be observed 
in, or from , the world today . However , Einste i n and Minkow-
ski s h owed tha t these explana tions we r e , in reality, onl y 
approximat ions . By relaxinf the assumpt ion of the inde-
pendence o f time a nd space , and usin~ a Hiemannian pe ometry , 
Einstein was able to extend the l i st of natural physic a l 
phenomena wh ich cou l d be expla i ned by the science of physics . 
Ec onomic s ha~ a much l ess l eplt ima t e claim t o the de -
scrip tion o f •ta science" than ha s chyslcs . Howeve r, i n some 
wanner, we may repard the develo pment of t he dynam i c theories 
of e con om ics 3s an analopous .developrrent to the exa~ple ~iven 
above. Of course thi s is a somewhat b iza rre analo~y , but it 
is true that the developme nt of ~ sound dynamic theory of 
econ omics wil l grea tly xpand the doma in of the science . 
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He nce t he objec t ive of th l s thes i s ls to c cnsider , approxi -
ma tely at the level r equired for the master ' s de~ree , and 
with spec i al ref erence t o a~rlculture , the development and 
i mplica t i ons of t he dynamic theori es of p r od uction . The 
thes i s i s conclud ed wi th the de scription of a me thod fo r c om-
parinp t wo syste ms of product i on . It is hoped that th i s 
method wi ll be seen to follo w log ically from the line of 
expos i t i o n f ollowed in the pr i or chapte rs , and will meet , to 
a reasona bl e degr ee , the requiremen ts of any s uch tt ethod 
wh ich a r e i nferr ed in these cha pters . 
J 
II . A COfliPAnI SON OF T'HE STATIC Al. D NOHSTATIC 
Ti!EORI ES OF PEC,DUCTION 
Analyt ically , t he theor y of choice ar.d the theori es of 
pr oduction a r e b a s i ca lly simi l a r . In f a c t it ls rea sona bl e 
t o ass ert tha t t he latter a r e a ctua ll y subsumed in t he former , 
since we may r egar d the p:e nera l theory of c hoice a s ar. ab-
stra o t , un interpr e t ed , sys t em of l ogic ; a nd the theorie s of 
pr oduction as t hose wh i ch a r e obta ined by making a pa r t i cul ar 
interpretat i on of the terms of th i s ~eneral sys t em. Thus 
anythin~ wh ich f or ms a funda~ent al part o f che log i c o f the 
theory of ch o i ce , will necessa rily be a funda~ental part of 
t ha t of the theories of pr oduction , and vi c e ve r sa . The r e -
fore , withi n th i s contex t , we ~ay r efe r t o e ither system 
i n t e r c hangeably . 
Trad1t1or.a l l y the mode l of choi ce i s based on an ana lyt i -
ca l s e pa r a t i on of pre ference and opportun i t y ( J? ) . ? irs t of 
a l l , it l s as s umed t hat the i nd ivid ual l s abl e to a r range i n t o 
a pr e f e rence orde r i ng , t he cho i ce s wi t h wh i c h he ~ay be con-
fronted . In orde r tha t th i s a ssumption of the ex i stence of a 
pre f erence ordering be t enab l e , i t i s necessa r y tha t th e unde r -
l y i np cho i ce functio n sat i s f y certa i n conditions . By as s um i ng 
t hat t hese condit i ons wi ll be sa t i sfi ed , the basi c axi oms of 
t he t heory a r e d efined . Thus fo r exampl e , i f it is ass umed 
tha t the underly i ng cho ice f uncti Oli sat i sf i es Samue l sc n ' s gen-
era l ized s t r onr, ax iom of r eveal ed pre f erence , t h is i s suf-
- ' '. , .. • •• '" • • • .~I • 
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ficient for it to be representabl e by a preference orderin~ . 
As is usual in economic th eory , behaviour which conforms to 
th ese axioms is said to be r at iona l , and t ha t which do es not 
i s called i r r a tional . Secondly , th e "powe r set" ls defined 
t o r e flect the limitat ion of t he indivi dua l to choos inR from 
some subset of t he doma in of h is p r eference orderinf . A 
famili a r example of such a r es triction is the simple bud get 
constraint i n consumer theory, wh ich limit s total expendi -
tures t o bein~ less than , or equal t o , tota l income. Another 
example , which i s perhaps more p~rtinent t o the pre sent d is-
c ussion , is th e f arr.1lia r closed , convex polyhedron wh ich 
c ha racter i zes the fea sible se t in linear prourammin~ p rob-
lems . With the se def ini t i on s of a preference orderin f and a 
power set , the rest is analytica ll y quite simpl e -- t he rationa l 
ind ividual choo s es that e lemen t from h i s power set 't;l1 ich is 
highe s t in his prefere nce orderinf . 
The th eori es of p r oductio n have been described as par-
ticular interpretat ions o f the p e nera l theory of c ho ice . He 
are now in a posit ion to enlar~e on this descri ption , and 
consequently to descr i be the hasls wh ich will be u sed to com-
pare the var ious theories of production . Quite obviously 
there a r e two bas ic int erpretations t c be made . These are , 
an interpreta tion of the prefe r ence orderinf ; a nd an i n t e r -
pre t a tion of the power set . They will be discussed l n turn . 
In the d iscussion of the theori e s o f production , the 
5 
uni t o f con t r o l wil l be assumed to be a slr.~le entrepr enP.ur; 
a~d th e domain of h i s preference orde rin~ t o be t he se t o f 
a ll possible courses o f action wh i ch he could fol l ow i n run-
ninp: hi s busines s . A "cours e of action" l s de f i ned ::ts o. con-
templ~ ted t i me - pa t h o f bus iness ~ct ivity , t he len~th of which 
will d ene nd uuon the len~th of t he ulannin~ hor izon . Thus 
for exa mple , a young f a rm er with a short pl a nninp.: horizon of 
say two years, may contempla t e t he t wo alte rna tive courses of 
action of ya r d-fa ttening ho~s in the firs t year, t he n s w1tch-
1np- t o ya rd- fa ttenlni:r s t eer s in t h~ second year; or of yar d -
fatt en in ~ ho~s ove r both yenr s . To e~ch cour s e of a c t i on the 
en trepreneur will be as sumed t o at t a c h a r::tn~e of mu tua lly 
e xclus i ve a nd exhaustive possible outcomes , measured in t er ms 
of ne t r e venue s . By att achin~ a s ubj ect i ve e stlm~t e of a 
prcb~billty d istribution def i ned on t he c l ements of th i s 
r anfe of outcome s , he will de t e r~ine the posit i on of each 
course of action in h i s pr efe r en ce orderinF ( 29 , 53) . In 
t h i s manner we ~ ive r e co,nlt i on to the f a ct s t hat , to a s 1r -
nif1 cant ext ent , the entrepr e neur' s business a ctivity i s a 
means by wh ic h the "priva t e consun;ot i on " c f such t hinP-"s as a 
f al'T' i l y c :ir, children ' s educat i on , ar.d so on , ma.y be made oo s -
s1bl e ; a nd t ha t the we ifhtinp- of uncerta in !"r ofit s a nd l osses 
i s essent i a lly a s ubj ective ma tter. 
Having defined th e pr e f erence o rde rln~ , the defin i t i on 
of t he po~er set f ollows quite eas i ly . Thus the oo~er se t 
..._...._ ~- • • • ~. ' r : ' '' " ~ ... .' 
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of the entrepreneur i s s imply thot part of t r.e domain of his 
preference orderinP which is currently available to him . 
The above definition of the domain of the preference 
orderin~ in the theories of production provides a conven i ent 
bas i s for compar i nr these theories , s i nce they a re de finitely 
characterized by the devree of knowledFe ~hlch ls assumed 
available on the pr obability of the outcomes attached t o the 
courses of action which constitute the do~ain of the prefer -
ence orderi nf . Usinr a similar basis of classificat ion , 
Johnson (J? , p . 1151) describes three ca te~ories of theor i es 
of economics . These a r e : 
(a) Stat ic theories , which assume perfect knowled~e 
of all t he relevant econow l c var iables and their 
relationships . 
(b) Risk- trend theorie s , which assume that there 
ex i s ts a kno~m r robab i lity distr ibution of the 
possible r elationships between the economic 
va riables . 
(c) Dynam ic theorie s which r ecop-r i ze that subjec-
tive estima tes of the ir probability distribu-
tions chanp-e over ti1re , throup-h the learnin~ 
process . 
We will follow t h i s class i ficat ion in the followinp- di s -
cussion , but we wi l l first r e - define it accordinF t o the do -
main of the prefe rence orderin~ which is inferred in Johnson ' s 
classification . However , since there is a definite ambiruity 
possible in the interpre t ation of t l1e i'lord ''proba bility" , it 
is necessa ry first t o describe the interpretation of it which 
wi l l be made he r e , and to de fine a r e t c f terms which will be 
used in conjunction with it. 
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There are t wo schools of thou~ht on the concept of prob-
ability , the object ivi st school , which defines probability in 
terms of relat i ve frequencies o f observations ; and the sub-
jectivist school , which defines nrobability in term s of 
"degree of bel i ef ''. In th i s thes is , we will subscribe to the 
latter school, thus followi nf! Arrov.; ln ucceptlnl!, the Keynesian 
interpretation that probability i s a subjective estima te and 
op i n i on of the 1r.dividual ( 2 ) . Hence we rray draw on the 
theory developed from the axioms of subjective probability 
a~d conditional probability in cons i deri rP- the learninp pro-
cess . Thus for example , we ~ay make use of the theorem that 
a concave functional , defined on a subjective prcbabllity dis-
tribution , follows a lower seml -martln~ale process . Since the 
r a npe , variance and mean deviation abou t the mean are all con-
cave functionals , t h is theorem impli e s tha t a riven probabil -
ity distribution will tend to conver~e to the mean , over time . 
This point will prove useful in the l a t er discussions . 
In i nterpretinP- probability in this manne r , the concept 
is obviously an extremely subj ective , or personal thir. r , ar.d 
ls very closely linked with the sta t e of knowledre c f the 
individual with respect to the topics in question . Hence we 
will need to use t e rms which define d ifferent st~te s of know-
ledre in which the entrepreneur ~ay f i nd himself . For the 
pre sent it will suffice to describe three . These a r e the 
states of subjective ce r t ainty , sub jective risk, and subjec-
8 
tlve uncertainty. In the subjectively certain state , the 
individual ' s an ticipat ions ~re sln~le valued . Thi s ls ob-
vious l y an extremely c onf i dent state of ~ ind , and in a~r i cul­
ture we may r a rely expect t o observe it. However, in t he 
foll owing di s cussion of dynami c theories it will only be 
a ssumed that the entrepreneur will feel subj e c t ively c ertain 
in his estima te s of the parameters of the probability dis -
tribution of outcomes , and not o f the outcome itself . This 
latt er assumption cha racterize s th e s t a te of subjective risk , 
where it ls assumed that the entrepreneur ho ld s sub jectively 
certain estimates of the paramet e rs of the pr obability dis-
tribution of outcomes (5J , p . 99) . In the ca se of s ubj ective 
uncertainty the paramet e rs of the orobability d istribution 
a r e no l onrer a ssumed known wi th cert a inty but only with a 
like lihood depend l n~ upon pas t experience (53 , p . 102) . 
We are now in a position t o re - state Johnson ' s classifi -
ca tion in terms of t he definitions of the doma i ns o f the 
pr eference orderin~s . If we def ine the se t S as the doma i n 
of a prefe rence orderlnf ; and the elements x 1 , p E:. S as th e 
c lements of this set , where x 1 r epr esents the ranpe of pos -
sible outcomes associa ted with the 1t h c ourse of a ction , and 
p represe nt s the probability d i s tribution de fined on this 
r an"e , we may r e - write th e class ifica tion as follows : 
( a ) Sta tic theori es , wh ich deal wi th cho i ce from the 
s e t s1 , where : 
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snd 
· where v1 i s a s inp-l e valued cut corre , and not a ranr-e of out -
comes . 
( b) h i sk - t r end theor i es , whic h deal wi th choice from the 
set 82 , where : 
where t he k 1 , i = 1, 2 , ... n , a r e parameters which are known 
with subjective c ert a i nty . 
(c) Dynam ic theor i e s, whi c h deal wi th chotce from the 
set s 3 , where : 
S3 = (xi , p I p = n (k1(l1111 ••• hlr ' t) , •.. 
kn( hn1 ' ••• hns ' t) ) ) 
whe r e a.t any time , t, tiie hii o.re assumed .known with subjec-
' 
tive certainty, but are t hemselves function s of t i me . 
Fr om tile se de finitions it ls obvi ous t ha t Sl c::. S2 c. S3 ' 
and he nce ·we may c l earl y s ec the J:- OV':! 'nen t to1~ards 1ncre3.shJ[; 
i;i:enera l i ty as \·Je relax the o. ssumpt i or1 s of perf ect lrnowl edee . 
The choice sets on which the thcori eo a r e defined a re vridened 
succe ss i vely , an to this extent , they arc that wuc h more 
concerned with reali ty . Of course it is not necessar~tly a 
bad thi r.P- that the domain of a theory re f~r rernov~d fro m 
real i ty (1 1 ) . However , if ~e ~ud~c the useful~~ss o~ a 
theory a ccordinrr t o 1ts abi lity t o ~xnlain relevant cconorc.lc 
phenomena , we must display dissat1sfacticn with the static 
theor i es because of t heir inabili ty to exp lain 
10 
••. t he objective quantities of roods and claims 
held at any point of t1~ e , and the objective mar-
ket prices at wh i ch they a re exchanfed , ~iven the 
subj ective tastes a nd expecta tions of the indi-
vidua ls a t this po int in time , (4J , p . )11) 
Similarly , we rr ust display dissatisfaction with both the 
static and risk- trend theories because of their ina bility to 
explain the relevance of the l ear r inf process , ar.d the in-
format ion ~athe rlnp. a ctivities so prevalent in modern eco-
nom i es , 
If we def ine the theory of decision-mak i~r as the expla-
nation of a s ystem by which an ind i vidual may eventually choose 
from various alternat ives open to him , when he is not certain 
of t he r elative positions of these alt ernat ives on his scale 
of preferences , it is i mmed i ate ly obv i ous that in the static 
economy , there is no need for such a theory . Given perfect 
knowledge of the present and future sets of circumstances , 
and the relevant preferenc e orderinp , evcrythin~ is a ctually 
determ ined . The entrepreneur has no r eal choice in the ma t -
ter but t o formulate an ini tial plan which l s consistent with 
the pr ice rr.echanism . Thus there i s no place in static theory 
for the dichotomy between "control by the pr ice mechanism" , 
a nd "control by the entrepreneur" (7 , n . )86) . 
Another i mmedlntc r esult of t h i s assumption of perfec~ 
knowled~e , i s the comnlete inability of the theory to explain 
the ex i stence of profit in the real 1·1orld , since the re s i mply 
could not be any profit in a static e conorr.y . ' Thlnp,s a r e 
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determined once and for all , so there ca n be no sur plus due 
to delays in re-ad .1ustinp- t c chanp;es in the data. The final 
s ituation ls foreseen , and the r elP.vant choices made . In 
fac t we can only allow the theory to consider chan~e s ln the 
data by assumi ng instantaneous , costless r e-adjustments to be 
made . Thus the use of the devi ce or comparative statics , and 
the complete inabi lity of the theory to explain the process of 
chan~e . It may only cons i der the effects of chan~es in equi -
l i brium situat ions . It can say nothln~ a bout the r a tes of 
adjustments t o these chan~es , and s o on. 
Thus we see tha t , because static theor i e s cannot contain 
any theory of decision- mak i ng , or any theory of profit , t hey 
a r e unable to offer a ny explanation of the ma intenance of 
stocks of voods and monetary c laims . These matters may only 
be explained by a lack of complete infor rea tion , wh ich is of 
cour se , ara inst the fundamental a ssumption of any stat ic 
theory . 
As we have defined the theory of decision- maklnp, we can 
see tha t it has no place in risk- trend t heories . Within the 
t heory of choice , there currently exists a se t of preference 
orderi nf'S defined on our set s2 . That 1 s where : 
These of course are the von Neumann-Mor~enstern prefere~ce 
orde rinp-s , w1- 1ch are representable uniquely up to a linear 
t r ansformation . rhe point of relevance he re ls tha t, since 
c .. , 
·''"'" ..... .. _:::: ,.,..\ 
:~:.. 
r ,. 
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we may re~ard the pre f e rence o rder l1 s be inv co~pletely de -
fined on s 2 , and since the risk- trend theor i es assume a 
' pe rfect ' knowledre of 82 1 or at le ~s t the r e l evant power se t 
c ontained in it , we can a~ain see tha t there i s no decision 
to be mad e . Everything i s a~a i n determined. The fund amental 
difference b e t ween t h i s case and the forme r is th3t knowledre 
is no t complete . The entrepreneur is merely subj e ctively 
certa in of a proba bility d i s tribution of possible outcomes . 
Gi ven a preference orderin~ on this cho ice s e t , and the ba sic 
assumpt i on that he will choose tha t c l ement fro m his power 
set wh ich is hi~hest on thi s pre f erence orderin~ , there l s 
a~a in no decision to be made . Of cour se thi s does no t rule 
out a theory o f pr of it , since it by no rr.eans i s a ssumed that 
this perfectly confident subjective e s timate of the probabil-
1 t y d i stribution wi ll be the correct one ; and even if it was , 
thi s would not be t o say tha t expec t a tions wo uld be realized . 
Thus we may v i sual i ze an economy of pe rfectly confident entre-
preneurs , who do not s eem to l earn by the ir mi stakes . In 
such a situat i on it is quite poss i ble to develop a theory of 
profit ( 25 , o . 170), ard , in th i s l l vh t , to rat ional ize the 
existence of stocks of r oods a nd mone tary clairr. s . 
To summarize s o far , we have f ound t hat we ~ay classify 
the s t at ic , ri s k - trend , and dynam i c theor i es of product i on 
accord in~ t o the doma in of t he pr e f e r ence orderl n? u pon which 
these theori es a r e defined . I n do ln~ so , we fi nd that the 
13 
static theori es a r e unable tc yield a theor>· of profit ; and 
ne i thc r the static nor the dynam i c t.heuri e s ure able to con-
sider the dec i sion maklnF process . It is because of their 
pot ential abil ity to do both these thinrrs , that we may rerard 
t he dynami c theories as be i nF wore real i s tic or ~e ncral in 
their appl i cability . 
The set s 3 on which the dyr.amic theori es have been de -
fined , hos been described as : 
where xi is the r a np-e of mutually exclus i ve and exha ustive 
possible outcomes , asso cia ted wlth the 1th course of a ct ion . 
However in thin case the probi:1bllity distribution p is not 
uniquely defined . Rather it is 8 ssumcd that there exists a 
probabili ty d is tr ibution of possible pzobability distribu -
tions u , · ..1h ich are defined cm t e ran~e Xi . ::oreo'· ~r , this 
former probability distributicn is a function of ti~e , and 
will chan~e accord ln~ t o the experiences of tt·e entrepreneur 
ove r time . It i s at this point that \:e may apply the results 
of t he theorem sta t ed earlier . By ~atherinr informat ion on 
any particular course of ac tion , and rnod lfy in~ his sub jective 
probability est imates a ccording t o Doyeslan infer ence , i t 
follows fr om the statr d theorem that all the nentioned meas-
ures of dispersion about the mean will tend to decli1e in 
ma~nitude . Thus , as a result o f t h is learninF process , we 
14 
may r epard the subje c t i ve est ima t es of the parameters of the 
p r oba b i l i ty distribut i on p , a s eventually be c ominr sin~le ­
v alued . When t h is occurs , the i nd i vidual has in e ffe ct 
reac he d the subjective - risk situation with res pect to this 
1th course of a ct ion . Hence he may then order it accor d i np 
t o h i s von Ne u mann- Morgenstern utili ty index . Thus we have a 
d e sc r ipt i on of a process whereby the entrepreneur may ~ather 
i nfor mat i on on the courses of a c tion wh i ch may i ntere st him , 
i n o rde r t hat he may chocse f r om amonv them, accord in~ to h i s 
von Neumann-~orgenstern preference orderin~. Conse quently we 
have demonstra ted tha t a theory of dec i s ion- mak i nf rr ust be an 
essential pa rt of any dynamic theory . 
I f we call C the relevant power set with wh i ch the 
e n trepre neur wil l be fac ed at a given time , we have that C 
is c omposed of elements of the set S3 ; and t ha t the e ntre -
p r eneur is unable to complete ly order the s e elements accord-
i np to his v on Neumann - Morgenste rn p r e fere n c e ordering , since 
he has insuffic ient inf or mation t o do so . It is quite r eason-
able to expec t that he may be able to classify some subset , 
say I , of the p ower set C, as con tain in~ e lements whi c h are 
de fi n i t e ly preferr ed to the re~u1n in~ clements in C , tha t ls 
those i n ( C - I ). However i t i s not po ss ible to or d er the 
e l ements of th i s "effic i ent set" without furth e r i nformat ion . 
Mo r eover , it is not reasonable t o admit the assumptlcn that 
the i nd i v i dual mi rht simulta neousl y ~ather information on all 
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the e leme nt s of C, since to do so would be tantamount to 
assum1n~ perfect knowledge of the p~rameters of p , which 
would return us to risk- trend theorv . Neithe r can we r eason-
ably turn the problem into a risk-trend problem by corepound-
ing probabilit y distributions , s ince to do so would be to 
obscure r elevant i nformat ion (15) . Thus it ts necessary that 
decisions be mad e concerninf on which subset of C to pather 
further informat ion , and ther e fore we car. s ee that a theory 
of decision mak inp under conditions of incomplete knowledpe 
mus t be an essential par t of any dyna~lc theory . 
Froro this , it i mmed i ately follo ws that dynamic theo ries 
ruust handle the lcarn1n~ process (1 ) , slnce this must form 
an inte~ral part of any proce~s by wh i ch a ratlon~l de ci s ion 
i s rea ched . Al s o , with the i ntroduct i on of decision theory , 
the role of the de cision- maker ( the entrepreneur in produc-
tior theorv , the corsumer in corsumotion theory) becomes so 
much mo re mean in ~ful . Thus 1~ s dyn~mic theory o f the firrr , 
full reco~n ition rray be ~ iven to t he role of mana~ement i n 
apport ionin~ expenditure amonFst the fgctors of production , 
and i n rr ax i mi z inp- net revenue under th12 p- i ven rrarket c ond i -
t 1 ons . From he re lt l of" i call:v follo ws that " the qual ity of 
manapement '' i s a major and di s crete f Rctor of production (28 , 
o . 15)) . In re co~n 1t1on o f this f act , much work has , and is, 
be in~ done on the tricky problem of es ti~atin~ the mars~e r. ent 
factor( € . ~ . 9 , )4 , 47 , 48 , 57) , althourh it s obv i ous lmpor-
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tance, especially in the field of arrtcultural production , 
where the lack of relevant information is perhaps ~reatest , 
has been r ecornized for year s . Thus the tremendous amount of 
work by a~ricultural e conomi s ts and a~ronomists in d eveloping 
informat i on to aid the farmer 1n hi s d ec l sion-makln~ . How-
ever the point t o be made here 1 s t ha t t h is work has had to 
be carried out without the guide of a ny ~eneral theory of 
production whi ch had, as a fundamenta l p ar t incorpora ted 
within 1 t , a theory of decision-makln~ under ircomplete know-
led~e . In the next two chapters , an a tteffi pt will be made t o 
indicate the basic posit i on of decision- r~akinf in a dynamic 
theory of production , and to d escribe the fra mework c f the 
decision-makin~ proce ss . 
• 
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III . TIIZ FRAMEWOI~K OF A DYNA~:Ic THLOhY C:F PliuDUCl'ION 
A. The Role of Dec i sion The ory 
Fundamenta lly, the objective of any theory of product i on 
must be t o explain a process by wh i ch the rational entrepr e -
neur ~ay maxi mize h i s utility under the conditions of envi -
ronment set by the a rea of defin ition of the theory . This 
area of definition ls, of course, described by the assumpt i ons 
made, and is correspond inflY narrower or b r oader , according 
as the assumptions are more or le ss restrictive . The wider 
the area of de finition, the ~reater the number of relevant 
phenomena which will need t o be inco rporated ~ithin the 
theory , and to this extent the more compl ex the theory i s 
likely to bec ome . 
We have seen in the previous chapter thnt the a rea of 
definition of dynamic theories is the ~ost troad of the three 
categories compa r ed , and tha t it i s correspondinrly more c om-
plica t ed by the necessary inclusion of the theory of decis ion-
makin~ . Essentially , the objective of this latter theory is 
to explain the process by which the i r.d i vidual moves from a 
state of subjective uncertainty, to one of subjectiye risk . 
Once this po s ition has been rea ched , the problem has been , in 
effect , converted into one of risk- trend , and the individual 
may choose from his " transformed " power set , C ' c:: s 2 , accord-
in~ to a von Neumann- Morgenstern preference ordering . Thus , 
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to this extent , we may r eyurd t he t heor y of decision- mak ing 
as p rovidinp a device by wh ich the theoretical problem of 
utility maximization under subje ctive uncertai nty, is tra n s -
f ormed intc one of subj ec tive risk . Th is po i nt may be illu s -
tra ted with the aid of a simple d la~ram (Fi rure 1) . 
The entrepre neur narro~s down h is ini t i al power set, C, 
by fi r st choos i nr a subset I c C, on wh ich to gather further 
i nfo r mation . By obtair.inp more infor~ation on the probability 
dist r ibutions of the e le~ents of I , h e final ly r eache s the 
pos it i on of subjective certainty in his estimate of t he para-
meters of the probability d i s tributions of the ele~ents of I . 
That is , h is power set i s tra nsform ed to C ' c:. S2 . lle r e we 
may say the dec l sion -makln~ process is fini shed , and cho i ce 
is a utomatically ma de accord i nf to his preference order i ng 
defined on c •. 
This d ia~rarr also serves to il l u s tra t e tha t it is some -
what an over- simplificati on to state that t he problem i s mere -
ly converted i nto a risk- tre nd si tua tion : The sets C , I , and 
C' have been drawn on a t ime axis , to illustr ate that time is 
requ i r ed for the process of d ecision-makin~ . The f a ct that 
an interval of time elapses be t ween C a~d C' has i mportant 
effects upon the opt i ma l time - oath of r esource u se for the 
e ntrepre n e ur, 1 as will be shown be low. Ilowever, with thi s 
1The opt imal time path l s a subject i ve th in~ . 
- ~--'-"-.: --· --- - ... ... . ~ 
c c: s J --
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~i ~ure 1 . The chan~es in the poKer ~Pt brou~h~ ~bout bv 
the declslon-maki~G process 
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qualificat i on in mind , this does seem to be a reasonable 
descri ption of t he role of decision t heory in the dyn9.Ill i c 
theory of production . 
Hav1n~ so described the position of d ecision- theory , we 
may l eave i ts deta i led discussion until the next chapter , 
since we s re presently concerned with ~ escribin~ the frame -
wor k o f the dynamic theory , a nd not t he details of its funda-
men tal pa rts . 
B. A Def i nitive Sta tement o f t he Problem 
We have already ata ted t hat the n ro bJeQ t o be s o lved by 
any dynamic theo r y of production mus t be to explain a pro-
ces s by which the r a tional entrepreneur may maximi ze h i s 
utili ty , under t l1 e condttions of environment set by the area 
of definition o f the theory . Howev~r , t h is is a broad and 
nebulous sta teme nt, a nd there f or e , by fir s t considerin~ its 
var ious implica t ions in p:ren t e r de t a il, pe may ach l. eve a more 
prec ise definition of the t a sk of th e theory , and con sequently 
a better i dea of th e fundamen tal problem s to be faced . Thus 
we will now consider the followln~ no ints : 
1 . In wha t r espe ct is util i ty t o be maximized . 
2 . Unoer ""ha t condttions must t h is ~aximi zation t a ke 
place . 
These will be dealt wt.th in turn . 
? l 
1 . 'rhe meaninr o f u tll1t.v ron~ l m\. zut lon 
In the history of e c onom i c thouf,rh t , "utility" , has been 
~iven ma ny connota tions (4 9 , o . 80) , and t he refore so has 
"utility maximiza tion" . We will foJlow current prc.ctice and 
a ssume a "leve l of utility" , to r epresent noth i ncr mo r e tt1 an a 
positi on in a pr eference order1 n~ . Thus "utility ~ax imiza-
t i on '' i s defined a s the ach i everren t of the h l rhes t a ttainable 
position on the prefere nce order . Given this definitio n , t he 
possible amb i ~uity between maximization of e xpe rienced , as 
opposed t o anticipa t ed , utility i s r emoved (49 , p . 81 ) . Thus 
we assume tha t the entrepreneur l s f~ ced with a set o f pos -
slble choice s , wh i ch he a rran"es in a preference orderin~ 
acc ord in~ t o the pre f c r a b i lity of the ir ant icipa t ed conse-
qu enc e s , and from which he ma kes thr correspondin~ choice . 
·rhat 1 s t o sav , ~;e consider th e rra.x lmi zation of ant lei pa t ed 
utility , a s it has been deflred above . 
2 . The conditions under whi ch maximiza tion 
mus t be carrie d out 
We have establ i shed that the entr epre neur will seek to 
choose the ele~ent of cholce from hi s powe r set , C cs3 , 
which i s hirhes t on his pre f erence orderin~ , where SJ is t he 
set : 
S J = ( x i , p I P = P ( k 1 ( h 11 , • • • h 1 r ' t ) · · · kn ( hn 1 ' · · • 11 n s ' t ) ) ) 
S ince time i s a very r e l evant fdctor , it follo ws tha t 
inact i on i s it se lf a choice , since it is equi va lent to the 
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re j ect l cn cf <l ll th e c le 'ilcri ,..-:; of l ·· · t~ lc l1 a r e i :rrr.cdia tely 
ava i lable (J9) . Thu s follow ln~ Kocpmans , 
We c a n the refore look upon t concm l c chclce at a ny 
0r.c timP es an lnPvltable choice between seve ral 
or many speci fic subcpcortunltl es , i . e . , sucsets 
of th~ opport unity set tha t are ava ilabl e at tha t 
t i me , prov i ded cho i ce is made r l {lh t the n . ( J9 , 
r . 245) 
;·orcover , ..,.:= do not have lndepE: rrl erce betv:eer the choice rr1ade 
now , ar.d tllo.se •. ,:. i ch may b~come r.i.va i 1able at some future 
dat e: . Thus t h 8 cond l t t erns of !Jr~sent choice from the cur-
rent power s et , ~rA such th a t th~ choice actually ~ade from 
thls curre~t ,ow~r s~t wl ll 1eteT .. lne the future po~er sets 
fro~ Hhl ch sutsAquent cho ices ~~y be made . Figure 2 may aid 
i n clarifylnv th i s point (39 , r . 245) . 
Suppose a t t i me t 0 the entrepre neur i s cons ider in~ 
c ho i ce betwe~ n the n i ne alterna ti ve courses of action de-
s cribed by time paths cc~ c~ , 1 z1 , cc~ c~ , 2 z2 , cc~ c~ , J z3 
e t c . ~s sentially he will chees e only bet~ e en the t~o ini -
tlal a l t 0 rnati vc cour se s of actio~ A1 and A2 . Thus for 
example , we could r e~ard Az as inve stment in ad aptin~ a n old 
barn f or beef product i on , whereas Ai mip:ht be inves t ment i n 
a hl~hly special i z ed fe edlot system . These alterna tives Ai 
a nd A2 are whnt Koopma ns calls "subopport unities" , since they 
each 1 effect def i ne subse ts of t he initial power set . The 
c ourses of action whlch cor~t ltu t e these subsets e ~ ch have i n 
c ommon the time path from t 0 t o t 1 . 
z1 
Z2 
Z) 
z4 
z5 
Z6 
z7 
z" 
c 
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Fivurc ~ . The ccnstitut1on of Lhc po~er set 
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Quite obvi ously , as the power s e t C i s de fined , i t con-
t a ins a lar~e number of e lements . Koopmans ' dev ice provi des 
an ingeni ous method of red ucin~ the number of r e l evant 
choices i n a man ner wh i ch i s i n tuiti vely very appeal i np- , 
since it do es describe a lo~ical method wh ich one would ex -
pect to be obse rved in r eal life . I t ~lso brlnFs out clearly 
t he dependence of f uture power s e t s on current cho ices , and 
provides a n excellent illustration of the fundamental d iffer-
ence between fl exi ble and s pec i al i zed methods of pr0duction . 
We may now make a def i n itive statement of t he problem to 
be answered : The process must be exnlal ned , by wh ich the 
rational entrepreneur may max i mi ze hi s ut ili ty un11 er condi -
t i ons in wh ich choice ls inevitable , and there i s a def in ite 
dependence betwee n curr ent and futur e choices . 
C. The Case of Subject i ve hisk 
By a ssuminv tha t t here existed a ~o int prob3bili ty dis -
t r ibution of possible prices a nd interes t r ate s , t he pa r a -
meters of wh ich were supposed t o be k nown with subjective 
certain ty ; and by also assum in~ th~ t the tran sfor~atio n func -
tion was known with sub Jcctive certai nt y , Ti ntne r (5 3) de -
fined the probabili ty d i stribution of nnticipated discounted 
net pr of it , W. He then as sumed tha t the maximand was a "risk-
pre f c r ence functiona l" , F , where : 
F = F ( Q ( W) ) 
. - -- - ~ - -·· ·~ ! ~ . • ... .. j .. f. -.J 
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and wh e r e Q( W) was the probabi lity distribut i on of antici -
pated net discounted prof it . He: used a func tional , rather 
than a function, t o stress t he opinion that t he value of F 
depended upon the who l e probability discr ibuti on o f W, and 
not s i mp l y upon i ts expected value . 1 He thus obt ained the 
condit i ons nece ssary for this functiona l t o be a maximum , and 
from there , obtained an expression f or the demand or suppl y 
d i ffe r entials . 2 However, in the light of cu r rent theory , it 
would a ppear t ha t h i s conclusion t hat a functional should be 
the maximand , c a used h i m to cons iuer too ~eneral a p r oblem 
( 12 , pp . 60 - 61 ) . 
To draw a parallel wi th t he current exposition , F would 
be a functiona l r epr esent i np t he von Neumann-~or~enstern 
prefe rence orderinf defi ned on the set S2 . Ho~ever, s i nce 
we a re usln~ such a pr e ference ordering , we need only con-
sider F as a function , no t as a funct 1onal, s i nce , according 
t o the von Neumann- Mor~ens t ern hypothesis , the util i ty of a 
probability d i stribution of cho i ces is e ~ua l t c the expe cte d 
util i t y of it s c omponents . Thus the ~ax lmand wh ich need be 
c onsider ed here is s impl y : 
F = F ( Q ( 1,l) ) = G ( W) , say . 
1 In th i s he was f o l l owlnp: !!arschak ( 42 , p . 261) • 
2The writer does not u;ean to infer tha t his present 
knowledpe of the calculus of va~lation s ls s u ff ici ent for a 
c omp l e te comprehension of Tin t ner's r e su l ts. 
.. . 
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Wi th this qualif ica tion , ·r1ntne r' s p rocedure "Will be 
followed in the treatment of the risk- trePd case . Let Xu , t 
be the anti cipa t ed production of p r oduct u , or the ne~ative 
of f a cto r u used a t time t, it be the antic i pated inte rest 
rate at time t , Pu ,t be the a nticipat ed ~rice of the pr oduc t 
or f actor u , at t he t i me t , and al so let qu , t be the antici -
pated d iscounted p ri c e . That l s to say , 
where ri = (1 +it), i = 1 , 2 , •.. t . 
Then the net d i scounted prof it for the firm is 
w = 
m n 
L E 
v=l s=l 
xv , s qv , s · 
Assume tha t t he pr oba bility d i stribution wh ich expresses the 
"subjective risk antic i pations '' of t he firm, be p- i ven b y : 
Pdp1 1 , • . . dPmn • d r , 
k1, ••. ku)d P11 • 
drn = P (P11 • ··· Pmn• i1, 
dPmn ' di 1 , ..• din • 
. . . 
In this ca se of risk-tre nd, the k pa ramet e rs are assumed known 
with subj ective certainty . Th i s probab ility distribution 
g ives the p r obability that simulta neously , P11 will be in the 
interva l P11 and P11 + dP11 • •• . • Pmn will lie in the 
int e r val Pmn + d Pmn • . . . . in wil l lie be tween in and in + 
din· Gi ven th i s pr o ba bility d ist ribu tion , the probability 
d istribution of ant i c ipa t ed n e t p r o fit W can be found . Th~s 
we may obta i n : 
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~d w = r~ ( w ; x 11 , . • . x:Jm ; kl ' • . . kn ) d · ..: . 
There f ore , l f •~e assume t he t. r an t; f orw:i tier funct i or. ~ , where 
t he problem i s t o ma ximi ze : 
F = G( W) = F( Q(W)) 
sub j ect t o g (x11 , ... Xmn) = 0 . This yields the Lagrang ian : 
Max i mize : 
whence the ne cessary c ond itions : 
( 1 ) d F* = dG dg Vf'u , t = 0 u = 1 , 2 ... m oxu ,t ~ . 'dxu , t - t = 1 , 2 ... n 
( 2 ) dF* ()V = f ( Xl l • .. . Xmn) = 0 . 
We may r e - wri te ( 1 ) as : 
( 3 ) 
'd e P' u ' t l , 2 ... m (JQ = v . u = Q t t = 1 , 2 ... n u ' 
and we may cal l -~ ~ the ma rginal utility of disc ount ed an ti -
1 cipnted net prof its; P'u , t is the partia l o f F wi t h r espect 
to xu , t i Qu , t may be call ed the marri nal e ff ect of xu , t on 
the probabil ity t hat d i s counted ne t profi t , W, wil l be in 
s ome specifi ed interval . To abbrevi a t e , call t hi s the "ma r -
l This term i s used beariny i n mi nd Arrow ' s point , " ..• 
t he util i t i es ass i ~ned (by the van Ncumann- Morgenster r: index) 
a r e no t in any sense t o be i nterpre t ed a s some intrinsic amount 
of ~o od in t he outcome ..•. Ther ef or e , ... we are f r ee t o 
assume that margi nal uti l ity (may be) i s increasiny ." (2 , p . 
425) . 
' ·-I 
l ) 
.. 
•' ... 
28 
~inal probabilitv e ff~ct". The neccs r arv c c n~ ition8 (1) are 
equivalent to : 
( 4) P'v s ~
~v , s 
v , u 
s , t 
= 1 , 2 ••. n1 
= 1,2 • •• n 
Very crudely , conditions (4) could be called "the ratios 
of mar~inal product ivities t o the mar~inal probability 
effects, of all factors and products , should be equal ." This 
is not real ly a very satisfactory expression , but it has so~e 
small amount of intuit i ve appeal in tha t it s eems reasona ble 
that entrepreneurs should bala nce effects of f octor and 
product chanRes with the ir anticipa ted eff e cts on the prob-
ability of achieving some level of profit . 
The above treatment of tr e ut ill ty max i m! zat ion problem 
under conditions of subjective risk, may be r era rded as y ield-
1rg the solution to the proble~ cf he dynamic theory of the 
firtr, since we have assumed tha t , throurrh the decision- mak i np-
process , the entrepreneur r eaches the uosit lon of subjective 
risk , from which be choos es acco1dln~ t o a von ieumann-Mor-
r-enstern ureference orderinp- . Ho i·1ever , fer the purroses of 
the present chapter this arproach is unsatisfactor y , since lt 
has in no way explained the re l evance of the dependence of 
future newer sets on current c hoiceR . This topic will indeed 
be dealt wi t h tn the next chapter in th e discussion of the 
decislon-makir.~ nrocess , but tn order t hA t we may develc9 a 
framework for th i s d i scussion we will briefly de scribe Tint-
-:.> 
f .. 
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ner ' s treatment of the case of subj ~ ctlve unc er ta inty . 
D. The Case of Subjective Uncertainty 
First of all, assume that the t r ansfo rmation function is 
kn own with certainty . In this case , Ti ntner (SJ , p . 102) 
again assumed that there ex i sted a jo i nt nrobability distri bu-
tion of a nticipa t ed prices and interest rates , characterized 
by k parameter s k1 , ••• kk . However , this t i me the se pa ra-
meters a r e not suppo sed kno~~ wi t h subj ective certai nt y , but 
are supposed to be jointly d i stributed a ccord i np- to a "like -
lihood functio n ", L , where : 
Ldk1 , ••• dku = L (k1 , ••• kk; h1 , ••. hh)dk 1 , ••• dku . 
The c har acteri stics of this likelihood funct i on are assumed 
to depend upon the past experi ence of t he en trepreneur , whom 
we now may r egard as beinf, l ess supremely self-confident , and 
more enli~htened conce r n ing his own fal l ibility. Given th i s 
likel ihood functio n , and the probability of the anticipated 
net prof it , Q, where 
Q = Q( W; X11' ••• xmn ; k1 , • .. kk) , as before , 
he th en defines the l i kelihood of t he ant icipated net profit, 
w, 
MdW = M( W; h1 , ••. hh) dW 
which expresses the likelihood that expecte d profit , W, will 
be between W and W + aw . He then assume s the rrax i mand to be 
a prefe r ence functional , S , which expr e s s es the preference 
-:..i 
f:~ ... 
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for subjective uncertai~ty . Thus : 
S = S (I; ( W)) 
and from here he der i ves the necessary conditions for this to 
be maximized . 
We may now apain draw a pa rallel ~lth Tintne r ' s tres tment 
of the problem and the cur1ent expcsition : 
The as sumption of the ex i stence of the functional S i s 
not equivalent to assu~ inr the existence of a preference 
order i rw over the set S3 . Accord ln?" le our present t ermin-
olory, T1ntner assumed the decisi cn- making precess to be com-
pletcd in forrr in~ the likelihood functi cn for M from the like-
lihood function , L, and the probe bilit y d i s tribut i on of anti -
c ipa. t ed net profits Q . Thus a~·a ln S would represent a von 
Neumann- Morgenstern preference orderinp de fir.ed o n the set 
S2 . As will be pointed out later, this as sumption that there 
exists in the en trepreneur ' s mind an! pr i ori known distribu-
tion of the r e levant parameters has import ant implicat ions in 
the decision-makin~ process (29, o . 109) . The po int of ir. -
t erest here ls that apa in it does not seem necessary to a ssume 
that S i s a functional , gnd therefore we rnay expect t o derive 
exactly analovous results to those obtained in the risk-trend 
case . 
Thus we may r epard Ti ntne1 ' s trentrrent of this case of 
subjective uncertainty as providinr the framework of a theory 
of the firm in a dyna~ ic s i tuation . llowever , it i s not yet 
-:.!. 
.. , 
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quite sat i sfactor y on two counts : 
(i) It does not conta in a procedure f or deal inr wi th the 
dependence of futur e power sets on current choice s . 
(ii) Althourh the rol e and poslt l on of dec ision theory , 
as it has been defined here , i s quite corr.patible with this 
framework, the ac tual proce ss of decision-makin~ is not at 
all dealt with , and t c this exten t , is at tributed t oo little 
importance in the t heory . 
The first point ~ives no r eal pr oblem, since Tl ntner d id 
expand the case of uncertainty to i r clude fl exibility and 
adaptability , a nd WP will do likewise bef or e complet inF this 
chapter . The s e cond point is not reall y u valid crit i cisrr. 
cons1der 1n ~ that h i s develo pment i s bein~ used in t his chap-
ter to ske tch the f ramework of the theory . As was stated 
ea rl i er , we will di scus s de cision- t heory in the next chapter . 
E. Fl exibili t.' and Adaptabili t y 
We ha ve s een that the e xpected eff ect o f h i s cur1ent 
choice on his future set of choices , i s a r elevan t factc r 
influencin~ t he entrepr eneur i n makln~ th is current choice . 
He must make so me choice , since inaction l s it self a choice , 
and he must mak e t h is choice without c ompl ete knowledFe . 
Thus it is reasonable to postulate tha t he will tend to make 
that choice which will le1ve him a dep-re e of maneuverabil ity , 
in order that he m 1~ht take advanta~e of future informa tion . 
... ... 
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This ls the reasoninr, of Hart (14 , p . 59) a nd Stl~lcr (51, p . 
J05 ), when the:v discuss the l mpoi·tance of flexlbll1ty and 
adaptabi lity in business planninf under uncertainty . The se 
two properties of a business plar have t r ls "dep-rec of 
maneuve r ability" in common . (To return t o Koopmans ' diagr am 
on page 23, alternative A2 would represent the flexible or 
adaptable plan , since it leaves a ~reat er choice of future 
alternatives . ) Stlrler distinguishes between them as fol -
lows. The property of adaptability i s at tribut ed to a fixed 
plant which is fundaoent ally desi~ned t ~ produce a ~iven out-
put in the most efficient manner , ~ c defined by existing 
technolo.P'Y. If t i· i s plant can be adapt E. d to the efficient 
use of othe r than the opt i~al combination of variable fac-
tors, it is said to be adaptable. en th e other hand , the 
property of flexibility is attributed t o a fixed plant wh ich 
is not desipned to produce a f i ven output in a most eff lcient 
manner . Rather it i s desi r-ncd to aoorox ima te the most effl-
cien t pla nts ove r a ran~e of outputs . 
Tintncr trea ts both flexibilit y a nd a daptability to~eth -
er , in r ecornit ion of their fundamenta lly similcr nature . 
We will c omplete this chapter with a description of his trea t -
raent , and r eturn i n a later chapter to e xpand on thi s i rr. por-
tant topic, and t o discuss it s specia l relevance to africul-
tural production . 
Thus f a r , Tintner has assumed tha t there exists one 
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t r ansforma tion function which wa s as sumed known with subjec-
tive c ertain ty . Now t h is a ssumption mu s t be dro p ped. Thu s 
we begin with the a ssumption of a number , m', of transforma-
tion functions, f(l), •• . f (m'), wh i ch are known with subjec-
t l ve certainty 
( 1 ) f( j )(xl l ' X21 • ••. xmn ; ti j) ' t~ j )' 
j = 1, 2 . • • m' 
As b e fore we have a jo int proba bility d i s tribution, P , of 
anticipa t e d pr ices ard interest r a t es , a r.d a likelihood func -
tion, L, e xpressinF the likelihood of the p : rameter s of th i s 
probability distribut i on P . However , to express t he assump-
t1on t hat t he i nd i v i d ua l believes he may i mprove h i s f o r e c as ts 
in the f utur e , Tintne r i n troduces a "se c c nd-order l ikel i h oc d 
f unction" , N, for the parameters of L. Thu s we now have : 
N = N(h1 , • • • hH ; a 1 , ••• aA ) . 
From this , i n the usual manner , the like lihood function , 
B, for expect ed d iscounted ne t prof it 1~ de rived , t h us y ield -
Bd.W = B (W; a 1 , ••• a A) dW 
and t he n ew prefe rence functio n , X, fro m wh ich the n e cessary 
c ond itio ns for a maximum may ava i n be fo und. 
The procedure wh ich Tintner follo ws in t h i s situation is 
bri e fly described below . 1 Since h e and A. G. Hart s eem to 
lMore corre ctly , thi s is ap interpre tat i on o f the jo int 
i mplica ti ons of t '1e two works by Tintnc r c l t ed a bove . Thus 
a 0y a~omolies should not be a t t rib uted t c Professor T i ntner . 
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have concur red in t . eir opinions on t hi s ~att er, a d ia~rnm 
constructed by llart is then used t o i l l us tra te Tintne r ' s pro -
c edure . 
Again the individual is a ssumed t o ha ve a fi xed plannin~ 
horizon c f n intervals of time . His irr.me di a te problem i s to 
decide on production ov e r the peri od 1 , 2 , n' < n (as sum -
1n~ that he is a t t i me zero ). ~e beg in by assumin~ a n a rbi -
trary choice of inputs f o r this period . Tha t is to say , we 
make no assumption s about the i n itial p l a n of prcduct i on for 
this period . The firs t pa rt of t h e oro blem is t hen to ma x-
i m1 z e a nticipa t e d discounte d n e t p r ofit, J, ove r the inte rval 
n ' +l, n ' +2 , ••• n . This ls equivalent to maximizin~: 
m' 
J + l: 
J=l 
and thus a set of nec essary conditions may be obt a ined , a nd 
a set of ma ximum s o lutions , xvs • be f ound . The s e inputs will 
be a function of expected prices , int e r e s t r a te s , a nd th e 
(1) ( m' ) 
t e chnolorica l f a ctors t 1 , ••. tm ' , wh ich cha racte rize the 
m' transformation functions . Thus we obta in what mi ght be 
called a set of first - order conditions on t h e optimum choice 
of quantities of inputs and produc t s for t he pe riod 1 , 2 , ..• 
n • < n . 
These conditions a re the n impo sed by substituting t he 
quantit i es x v s into t h e definition of a nt i cipa t ed discounted 
net pr o fit , i . e . , 
-J: --~ 
r\ 
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J = E 
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n 
L XvsQvs 
v=l s=l 
Thus we now have J as a function of the an tic i pa t ed 
prices and inter e s t r a t es a s usual . Howeve r i t now a l so de -
pends upon the t echnolof-ical pa r ame t ers and i n i tial a rbitra r y 
inputs . From he re , the u sual procedure i s f ollowed to y i eld 
the uncertainty preference function . However th is now depe nd s 
upon the inltlal se t of inputs and ou t put s ov er the interval 
1 , 2 , ••• n', a s we ll a s the pa rameters o f t he s econd order 
likelihood function, B. That i s , we now ha ve : 
This is n ow maximized with r e spect to the ant i cipa ted 
quantities Xvs to be used or prcduccd ove r the period 1, 2 , 
. . . n ' . Thus the op timal input s and outputs over t his period 
may be found, and we obtain 
xvs = xvs (a l , ••• aA) s = 1 , 2 .· .. n ' 
which the r e f ore de pends upon th e paramet ers of t he likelihood 
function. 
The d i aFram, illustra ted on pafe 36, constructed by Pr o-
fessor Hart (14, p • .58 ) i s u sed t o i llustra te t he i mpl i ca tions 
of the above a .ialys l s . 
To construc t th is diaFram, Hart assumed : 
(a ) The flrm sells only one product . 
(b ) There l s no uncerta i nty of t ec hnoloFy , buyinp- prices 
or i nterest - r a t es . 
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(c} The amount of 12:oods available at a p: iv en futur e time 
i s independent of expectations of sales at other 
d&tes . 
(d) The selling market at a ~ive~ futu re time is un-
aff ected by sales or purcha ses at other dates . 
(e) The flrw ls not subject to capital rationing . 
He later removed these assumptions , and showed that 
their absence d id not affect t he fundamental 1mpl1cs t1ons 
which may be drawn f r om the d i apram . 
TC is the locus 0 f the minimum poss i b le total costs for 
each leve l of output . CC ' is the cost curve result ing when 
operations a re adapted to producing an output xm at mi nimum 
cost. Thus, by def l nitior1, it must touch TC at P , ar.d lie 
above it elsewhere . r 1 , r 2 , r 3 r epresent revenue curves, 
showin~ receipts under the three mutually exclusive and ex-
haustive condi t i ons assumed poDslble . 
The dia~ram ls constructed with r e spect to tioe tk. It 
is now assumed t hat at some int ermed i ate time tr, t 0 < tr < 
tk, the entrepreneur expects t o be quite certain which rev-
enue curve will actually occur . (Thus we may r epard tr to 
be equal t o n ' in Tl ntner ' s analysis . ) ·rhe probl em is there -
fore t o choose a prov isiona l output , xm, in order that the 
~reatest advanta~e may be taken of t he fina l situation, r 1 , 
r2 , or r3 . Tlntne r's "first order" cond itions ma.v be re-
p.ar ded as being equ ivalent to requirin~ the choice of any 
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provis i onal output Xm , such that the resultinv cost curve CC' 
is nowhe r e below TC , a nd touches lt at the point where output 
is equal to Xm • The remainder of the problem is to choo se 
xm , takin~ i n to acco unt the entrepreneur ' s uncertai nty a bout 
the likelihoods o f the respective market situations , and his 
willin~ness to take long or short chanc es . 
We have seen above that , followinf the development of 
the von Ne umann- Morgenstern theory , in retrospect , it seems 
that Ti ntner considered too general a problem when he assumed 
that the maxi mand must be a functional. In view of this , we 
may now use Hart's diaf ram to illustrc t e the fu ll so lution t o 
the problem . 
Followin~ t he procedure de s cribed on pa~e 24 above , the 
entrepreneur may be re~arded as es timat ing the expectation 
functi on of receipts, EH, from his likelihood function B. 
He then chooses Xm so that the distance , (PP ' ) between ER 
and TC ls greatest . 
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IV . DEC ISION THEORY 
With t he developments i n stat i s tical and ma thematical 
maxim iziny t echni ques which have occurred over the l ast two 
decades, the title of this chapter may su~ge st a var i ety of 
possible discus sions , rangin~ throuf.h stat istical decision 
procedures and var i ou s provramm in~ methods , to e xplanat i ons 
of the proce ss by wh ich the rat i onal entrepreneur may move 
fr om a position of s ub jective uncertainty , to one o f subjec-
t1ve ri sk . However the ob~e ctive o f thi s chapter will be 
limited to a descri ption of the l atte r proce ss . 
As is common to most problems in e c onomi cs , t he theo-
retical analysis of such a subj e ctive proces s infers the ne ed 
t o b ec ome i nvol ved in the theory of t he sociolop. ica l and psy-
choloFi cal processes which govern human beha vior . llowever , 
the e c on omist may circumvent the need t o be come so i nvolved 
by e i ther : 
(a ) Simpl y observinr- e ntrepre neurial act i v ity , ar.d f r om 
such observa tions , developing a f r amework o f explanat i on by 
de finin~ the vari ous s i tuations in which t he entrepreneur 
finds h i mself , and by t hen cla ssify i nf the st i mul i wh i ch cause 
h i m t c move into ~hese s ituat i or. s . That i s t o say , adopt i nr 
the empi r i cal approach . 
Or , (b ) postulatin~ fundamental ax ioms of behavior , and 
from there , theore tically developi n~ a process which the 
"r a tional " entr epreneur wcu l d follow . 
~ 
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The first approa ch is tha t of Johnson and Haver ( )5 ) , in 
t he ir d i scus s i on of the deci sion-makln~ pro cess l n agricul -
ture . The second approach i s sugges ted by Koopmans ( )9) . 
The proc edure which will be f ol l owed here wil l be t o firs t 
describe Johnson and ilaver ' s fra$ewor k , then to attempt to 
deve lop an a xiomat ic exp lana tion, ba s ed on Prof essor Koop-
mans ' work , wh ich will fit into thi s framework . 
A. The Mot ivat ion Beh ind the Decision-~akin~ Process 
We have s een in the pr evious chapter that the funda-
mental obj ective of the entrepr eneur l s to maximi ze his util-
ity. Thus \·;e may regard h i s bu sine s s a ctivity ;:i s an i nter -
medi a t e activity necessary for the achieve~ent of thi s Foal . 1 
The more succe ssf ul he ls i n runn inp- his busine s s , the 
gr ea t e r will be h i s power set, and con sequen tly the further 
he may move up his p r ef erence order ln~ . In stat ic theories , 
where knowledge is perf ect, the motive to enlar~e the powe r 
set by 1.ncreasine prof i t ls all tha t 1t is ne cessar y to c on-
s lder .2 Thus the prof i t function and the utlllty function arc 
1~ a one -to- one re l a ti onship , and when the former l s max -
i mized , s o l s the l at ter . Ho~ever , when t~e assumpt ion of 
perfect knowled~e l s dropped , thi s r ela tionshi p no lor.~er 
hold s and it l s no lon~er po ssible t o ut ilize th i s extrene ly 
1Th1s same business activity will , of cour se , for its 
own sake , en t er i nto the preference ordering . 
2Assum1n~ tha t this enla r gement doe s not involve excess 
amounts of entrepreneurial effort . 
. 
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obj e ctive measure o f entrepreneurial utility , He nce the 
utili ty maximizin~ choices of the entrep re n e ur no lon~e r 
simply depend upon profi t maximizat ion . With e~ch l evel of 
profit which ls antic ipated to follow f r om a particular 
choice or a ction, tr1ere rr.u st be associa t ed an ant i cipated 
probability of i ts realiza tion . Thus the utility max imi z ing 
choi ce becomes an extr eme ly subj e c tive thinp , and will de -
pend , inter alia , on the ant icipa ted c onsequences of failure 
( 37) . As a result of this , the wi ll i n,ane ss of an entr epre-
n eur t o take . lon~ or short chances , will not simp ly depen d 
upon his intrinsic psychological ch~racteri s t i cs , but will 
also depend upon th e current state of the business, 1 S ince 
the will ingness t o t a ke a chance and the amou nt of knowlede;e 
r equ ired t o make a d e cision wil l be j_nversely rela ted , we may 
re~ard such factors as the cur rent stote of the bus iness as 
determ inin~ the effic i e ncy with wh ich decisions may be made . 
B. Decision - Mak in~ as a Satisficinv Procedure 
In Chapter II the theory of dc cision- makinr- was described 
as a devi ce by which the theore ti cal ~roblem of utility ma x -
i mi zat l on u nder subj e ctive uncerta l r ty ~as transformed t o the 
more simple o ne of util i ty ~axim iza t 1on under subjective 
ri sk . However i t i-;as so described with the qua 11fics. t1 on 
lThl s wa s clearly demonstra t ed by a study by H ady et 
al , ( 18) . 
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that s i nce t i ille was needed f or decis i ons t o be made , this 
description must be re~arded as an oversimplif i cation , s ince 
it d ld not infer the relevance of flexibility in the choice 
of a ctions of the entrepreneur . 
The qual ification ment ioned abov e may be dealt with if 
we now descr ibe the process of decis1 on-makin~ as a sat1sf ic -
i nF pr ocedure . That l s to say , the entrepr eneur realizes 
that he has not enou~h i nformation to identify that element 
in his power set , C C s 3, wh ich is hirhest in his preference 
orderin~ . Thus he se ts h i mself some l eve l of aspiration , and 
re~ards t he achlevenent of t · i s level a s bc ir~ nearly enough 
equiva lent to max im izln~ his utilit y . Thus i n us i ng. the 
theor y of dec i sion- maklnv as a dev i ce to convert a dyna mic 
problem into a risk- t r end proble~ , we do not assume tha t the 
element of cho\ce , wh ich , yiven adeau~tc information , would 
be seen to be the optimum choice , wil l necessarily be found 
by the decisi on -mak in~ process . This po int may be cldrified 
with the aid of the d 1apram on pa~e 41 . 
In Chapter I we sa:: that 82 C. S3 , and \'ie now consider 
choice fr om the por,.;e r set C C S3 . We have seen t hat the 
first part of the decislon- makinr- proce ss i-1as to chee se a 
subset , I C::::::: C on wl1 ich t o trathe r further i nformation . These 
s r ts are r epresent ed i n part A of t hP d l apram, and the 
. 
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"partitionin~"l of C is enlarged i n B. Define xi , p as that 
unident i fied e l errent belonging to C which a ctually g the 
h1,hest on the preference orderinf, and whic h would therefore 
be chosen if the entr epreneur had adequatL information . We 
d o not assume that ii,p belon~s t o I n 8 2 (IC , and even if it 
does we do not assume that it l s chosen. 
c . The Framework of the Theory of Dec ision-Mak i ng 
In th i s section, t he discussion of dec1s i on-mak1np will 
be restricted to a consideration of the precess by wh ich a 
major en trepreneurial decis ion may be made . (Thus f or 
example we c o u ld apply the discussion t o the choice o f the 
type of plant to use in produc l nf some a l ready chosen prod -
uct.) However, in the dynamic e con omy , as in the real world , 
we h ave a state of th1nr.s where, 11 chan12"e is norrr.al, partial 
i gnorance ls universal'' (35, o . 1) and c onsequently where 
entrepreneurs mu~t continually l~arn a r d adj ust. Thus the 
foll owinp, points should be borne in rr ind throufhout such a 
res tricted discussion : 
( 1 ) We a r e dl scussin~ t he procecs whereby t he choice of 
a possible cou rse of a ction is made . The a c tual business 
a ctivit i es of the entrepreneur durln~ th e time he i s 1nv0lved 
in this process will affect his fina l choice throu ~h the 
lThe d 1a~ram infer s tha t C i s d i stinctly partitioned by 
82 and I . Th 1 s is not the case , and the i nference is allowed 
only to f a cilita t e the demonstra tion . 
) 
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effect o f t he ir ou tcomes on h i s consequent power sets . 
( 2 ) I n most ca ses t he e n t r epreneur will be attempt ing t o 
co-ord ina t e t he variou s ente r pri ses whi ch togethe r constitu te 
his bus i n ess . Thu s he s i multaneo usly may be i n var i ous 
stages of the dec i s i on - making process with respe c t to d iffe r -
ent ente rpr ises . 
In Section A we saw t he i mportance of anticipated cons e -
quences in t he c ho i ce o f a cti on s . Followln~ the l i ne of anal-
y sl s es t abl i shed in Chapte r I I, we may say tha t , for the most 
p a.rt, thi s po i nt is taken c a re o f in the const r uc tion of the 
relevant von Ne umann - Morpens t ern preference orde rln~ . How-
ever, as we ha ve seen in section B o f th i s chapter , i t is no t 
d ealt with compl etely i n t h is process , since a choice ls made 
in t he d ecision- mak i ng proce ss i tself. We may regard this 
l a t te r c ho ice as the fundamental p~rt of the decision- mak i ng 
proc ess , r epre s entinr- the bas i c dist i nct i cn between the 
dynamic a nd ri sk- trend t heories . Once the cho i ce of the sub-
set I has bee n made , we may r ega rd t he inf ormat i on vathering 
proce s s a s a mat t er o f course , le qd in~ final l y to the pos i -
tion of sub ject i ve risk. Cf course this is not to say that 
the information ga t he ring p r oc ess i s attribu ted mino r i mpor -
t a nc e , since , as will be c ome c lear below , the effic i ency wi th 
wh i ch t h i s p r oc edur e is carri ed out wi ll f undamentally det er -
mine t he effica c y o f the d e c i s ions made . 
J ohnson and Haver (35) d esc r ibed t he essential f unctions 
-, 
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of the entrepreneur as follows : 
(a ) To observe those factors wh ic h a ffect h i s busine ss 
environmen t . 
(b ) To analyze the data s o obt a ined . 
( c ) To decide on a course of a cti on ir.dica t ed to him by 
this analysis . 
(d) To a c t on t h is d e cision and rut the course of act i on 
into effect . 
(e) To accept responsibility for the consequences f ol -
lowi nf t h i s course of a ction . 
They enumera t ed . five fields wh ich the entrepreneur must 
study . 'rhe se ,,·er e : prices ; production xrc thod s and re sponses 
(incl udin f weather) ; potent i al t echnolovi ca l chan~es ; t he 
personalities of the people directly or irdirectly i nv olved 
in their bus i ne ss act ivit i es ; and the fe ner a l econo~ ic a nd 
pol i t i ca l s ituation . The se are~s may te re~arded a s to~ether 
determinin~ the environmen t in which the entrepre neur ' s busi- ,, 
ness must be conducted . We may re~ard him as t e inf involved 
i n pe rform i n p the a bove fun c tions in th i s environment , with 
the a i m of roaxirnizinf-" his utility . Wh ilP so involved , he may 
f i nd him se lf i n one of the foll ow inf" kno wled("e situations 
wi th respe ct t o a pa rticular course of a ction : 
(a ) The Ina ctive Situ9 tion. 
( b ) The Lcarnin~ Si tuation . 
(c) The Forced Action Situat i on . 
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(d ) The Subj e ctive fi isk Situa tion . 
(e ) The Sub jective Cer t a i n t y Si t uation . 
The first three are situa tions of subject i ve uncerta in-
t y , while we may re~ard the l ast t wo as be i ng e ssentially 
simila r . The en t repreneur i s r ep.arded u s first being in the 
ina ctive s itua tion with respe ct to a particular course of 
act i on . H!· then may move into the l earninP' situat ion , from 
which he may r e ac h any one of the l a st three cla ss i f icat ions . 
The d ia~ram on pare 48 illustra t es the nosslble sequences . 
With t h i s seque n ce in mind , we wi ll defi ne the se sltua-
tions , ac cordin~ t o Johnson and Haver , a nd a t t he same time , 
de scr i be the process by wh ich they conce ive the entrepreneur 
to r each a dec i sion concern in~ a parti cular course o f action . 
The i nactive situat i on may be r egarded us tha t s i tuati on 
i n whi ch the entre pre neur f inds h i mself before he c hooses the 
subse t I , f r om hi s pov:e r se t C. Th i s l at t er se t r.. us t now be 
r eFarded u s that part o f h i s sphere of awar e ness which s ee ms 
a ttainable t o him. That is to say , h i s powe r set may actually 
be l arre r than he is ._1 war e , bu t of course that pa rt of wh ich 
h e ls n o t a war e l s irreleva nt t o the discuss ion. 1 While he 
ls i n thi s situa tion , he may be r er,a rded a s l ackin~ adequa t e 
knowledpe to choose any c0urse o f act i on , a nd as be i nf unin -
terested in ga i n ing mor e . If he cont i r u es i n this state ov e r 
lor c ourse i t may also be sroal ler than he bel i e ves it 
to be . 
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time , this in itself wi ll contribute a cho i ce . 
The movement f r om the ina ctive situation i nto the learn-
ing s itua tion i s e quival en t t o the choice of the s ubset I 
from the power set C. Th is choice has been described as rep-
r esentinf the fundamental dist i nct i on be tween dynamic and 
non- dynamic theor i es , and is thus obviously a very important 
step in the dec i sion-making process. We will r e turn t o d is-
cuss it l a ter , s ince at pr e sent i t wil l suffice merely t o 
assume that t he en trepreneur r ecomes suff i ciently interes ted 
in a set of poss ible course s c f acti on t o dec i de if i t is 
worth while t o ,irather furthe r i nforma.tion on the i mplica tions 
of choosin~ t G implemen t any elemen t of this set . Thus he 
enters the l earn1n9-' s i tua tion , in wl1 i ch he fe e ls he does not 
know enou~h a bout the probabili ties ~nd mapn itudes o f the 
various poss i ble c0nsequenc e s of choosin" the d i fferen t 
courses. of act1ori , but f eels it su ff i ciently worth h i s wh ile . :i 
to ~athe r informat i on on these th lnfs . Quite obv i ously th i s 
proces s will take ti me , but since i t · i s essent i ally a very 
subj ective ma tte r, we ca n say nothinr about the lenfth of t i me 
necessary, but can only bea r in mind the po ints made i n Se c -
tion A of th i s chapter . From the l ear n i ng s i tuat i on , the 
entrepreneur may wove into any one of the l a st three know-
led~e s ituat ions . It i s i n t hese situat ions that a deci sion 
is made . 
The f orced notion s i tuation arises whe n the emerren t 
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c i rcumsta nces a re such tha t the entrepreneur must choose a 
particula r c ourse of act i o~ , r erardless of whether he feels 
that he has sufficient infor mation t o make t h is choice 
rat i or.ally . Thus a d e cision in s uch a ca se ls r eally l i tt le 
more than a ~uess or a random choice , a nd the r e f ore we may 
generalize and describe t h i s situation as somethinf which all 
ent r e preneurs wil l wish to avo id . 
The subjective risk s i tuat i on has a lready been defined 
as that state o f knowled~e in wh ich the entrepreneur is sub-
ject i vely certa in of the p ro bability d i stribution of po ssible 
outcomes followin~ c hoice of a pa rticula r c o urse o f act ion. 
Thu s his choice in this situation may be r erarded as being 
made ac c ordinp: t o a vo n Ne umann- Mo r gens t f! rn prefe r ence order-
i ng , and is therefore fundamenta lly s i mila r t o choice in the 
situa t i on of subje ctive c erta inty , wher he h ol ds single 
valued estima tes of the possible ou tcomes . 
Th i s descri pt i on of the va rious knowled~e situations 
through whic h an e ntreprene ur may move befo r e reachinr a 
decis i on has bee n found to be quite use ful in analyz in~ the 
process of dec islon -makin~ i n f a rm i ng ( 34) . The ax iomat ic 
approach of Professor Koopmans will now be used t o develop a 
theore tical explunation of the pr ocess , wh i ch fits int o the 
above frame work . 
We beg i n by extracting our fundamen t a l ax iom of b ehavior 
from a quotation by Professor Koopmar.s . Thus he wrote : 
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We can conf i dently assert that almost all choices 
occurring in real life a r e sequential "p i ece - meal" 
choices between alternat ive ways of narrowi ne; down 
the pre sently ex isting opport unity , rather than 
"once and f er a l l " choices between specific pro-
grams visualized in full detail . (39 , p . 245) 
In Chapter II , Koopmans ' device for reducinv the number 
of r elevant alterna t i ves from which choice must be made was 
described . Thus the power set ~as seen to be composed of 
subopportuniti es wh ich define sets of courses of action wh ich 
a r e jointly available for at l east the first time period . We 
will use this dev i ce to def i ne the choice of the subset 
I C c. Thus we will henceforth rega rd the choice of the sub-
set I as bein~ equivalent to t he choice of a subset of the 
subopportunit i es wh ich together constitute the current power 
set. I n other words , we will suppose that the entrepreneur 
choo ses to ~ather information on only some fract i on of the 
total number of alternative courses of act ion wh ich he f eels 
open to h i m. 
Thu s we will take the view that the entrepreneur will 
not i mmediate ly choose one parti cular course of action , but 
rather he will first choose from amonv the se t of suboppor-
t unit i es wh i ch together contribute his current power set. 
This choice will the n determine a nEw po~ er se t at a differ-
ent po i nt in time , from which a simila r choice will be ~ade . 
Thus the choice of the final course of act i on is in reality 
a sequence of choice s from narrowed power se t s . In other 
~ 
.1 
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words, we may state a s our axiom of entrep r eneur i al behavior : 
"The choice of a particular course of act i on i s the result 
of a t empora l sequence of choice s wh ich narrow do~m the powe r 
set." With this ax i om and one basic assumption, we may 
describe a process b y which the r a tional entrepr eneur will 
move from t he inactive situation , to t he s itua tion of subjec-
tive risk, from wh ich he may choose accordinf, t o a von 
Neumann-Morgenstern , preference orderlne; . 
We beg i n by a ssuminF the entrepreneur to be i n t he in-
active situation. Thu s he may be r efarded a s be in~ content 
with his b usiness as it is, and not beinF ir.terested i n con-
siderinF chanFeS in his policy . By t a king this view , we nar-
row down the area o f c onsideratio n to that o f bus iness p l an-
ning , and do not consider the "rout i ne'' decisions nec essa ry 
t o i mpleu1ent a g iven plan . As we h ave seen above , the e ntre -
preneur operates in a chang i ng environment , and it is this 
c onstantly chanFing environment whi c h makes it necessary for 
him to constantly l earn and ad just . Thus we see cha n ves in 
t h i s environment as beinF the s timuli which induce him to 
move into the lea rning situation . 
In Chapte r IT we say that i t was necessar y to assume that 
the entrepr eneur would not be able to ~a ther i nformation on 
all the courses of acti on open to h i m, indeed he wou ld not 
i mmed i ate l y be awar e of them all . Thus the nece s sity of fi r st 
choosin~ a subset of his possible choices was seen as the 
J .. 
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d i agnostic f eature o f a d ynami c theor y , and i n th i s sec t i on , 
thi s c ho i c e was s ubsequen tly def i ned a s the c ho ice of a sub-
se t of suboppor tun i t i e s. We now ~ake a bas i c assumption : 
t h a t the r e ex i s t s a p r e f erenc e orderln~ o f al l the s u bse t s of 
suboppo r t u n i tie s wit h wh i ch th e entr epre neur may be c on-
fronte d . Th i s seems a reasona bl e assumption t o make , sinc e 
in e ffe c t we a r e simply assumin~ tha t the en t r epr eneur i s 
a b l e to choos e b etwe en d if fe r e n t ways by wh i ch i t m i~ht b e 
po s s i ble f o r h i m t o maximi ze h i a u tili ty . For e xampl e , we 
would assume t h:\ t the f a r mer can dee i de whe the r he would 
r a ther f eed cattle a nd hop- s , o r produce mi l k and k eep hops , 
or f e ed c 3 ttle and sheep , a n d so on . 1 u1te obv i ous l y h i s 
e c onomi c condition s m i~ht b e s uc h that he has n o c ho i ce in 
t hi s ma t t er , but th i s does not preclude the possib i l i ty that 
h e m i~h t ha v e a p r ef erence orderl n" o f these t h inp-s . 
Gi v e n t h i s as s umpt i on , we may explain t h e t r a n s ition 
from t h e i nact i v e t o t he l ear n i nv si t uat i o n as fo llows . The 
current power set of t he entr epr e neur wil l hav e been det e r -
mine d by h i s pr evious c ho ices of c ourses o f a c t ion , and the 
subse que nt cond i t ion s of envi r onme nt wl1ich a ctua lly occurred 
f oll owl nF these c ho i ces . That i s , ~ P may sa y h i s c urr ent 
power se t i s de t e r mi ned b y h i s pas t ac ti ons and bus iness envi -
r cnmen ts . Th us i f he cheeses t o re~ain in t he i nac t ive situ-
a t i on , we may c onc lude t hat h i s current business a c tivities 
a r e those wh i ch he ~ost pr e f ers , ~ lv en h i s pr esent oppor-
tunlty. Furthermore , i n t h is case , his fu ture oower sets 
wi ll be d e termined sole ly by his bus ine s s e nv i ronment . Thus 
the movement f r om the i nactive situat i on into the l earnin, 
situa tion occurs when the e ff e c ts of chan~cs i n h i s environ-
men t so a l ter his powe r se t t hat he either may no lon, e r be 
able t o c ontinue i n his current ac tiviti e s , and will have to 
c hoo se a l ess preferred set ; o r he may find that it is now 
possible for hi~ to engage in a mor e pre fe r r ed set of a ctiv-
i ti es . 
Thus we have se en that t he e ntrepren e ur c hooses a se t o f 
subopportunities on wh i ch to rather further i nformat i on . 
Th is pr o cess wil l t a ke time , but the length of tim e r equ ired 
wi ll v a r y with t he individual , accordin~ t o h is expe rience, 
c i rcumsta n ces , and willin~ness to take chances . Eventually 
h e will r e c ognize these initial s uboppor tuniti es as them -
selves lead in~ to future subopportunities . In this way he 
finally builds up a picture of the v a rious alte rnativ e 
cours e s of ac tion wh ich he expe cts will co~stitute the sub-
opportuni ty . We reay e xpand on th is po i nt with the a id of 
the dla~ram in Fl~ure 6 . This r epresents a highly s i mplif i ed 
case , where i t l s a ssumed that the power set of the farme r ls 
initially c ompo s ed of f our subopr ortunities , to feed c a ttle , 
4 hcys , sheep , o r k eep da i ry cows . Thus he has a choice of 2 , 
t hat i s , 16 sets o f subopport unitle s . We suppose that h0 
chooses to inves tiga te c a ttle f eedlnr or milk produc in~ , and 
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we use the cattle fe ed1ng subopportunity to ind i cate how he 
may br eak down a subopportun i ty into i ~s constituent courses 
of action . 
I n t hi s simplified case , we as~ume that there would be 
onl y two alternat i ve feed i ng systems , namely to adapt an 
exist i np- barn , or t o invest in a new speciali zed system . We 
also assume t hat there is only a choice of feeding one type 
of calves or fin i sh i ng one type of steers . Finally we assume 
that i f the special i zed system i s chosen , it may only be used 
t o f i n i sh steers . Thus we may suppose that the farmer recog-
n i zes thE- se alternatives , and hence the alte rnati ve courses of 
action , as shown in Fi fi!:UJ'e 6 , which constitute this suboppor -
t unity. We suppose that he estimates th3t the non- spe c ialized 
method would i nvo lve a plann i nr horizon of two year s , while 
t he specialized me thod would 1nvolve one of r years . Given 
t he developwent of this estimate of the coPstituent courses 
o f act i on which compare the subopportuni ties "1d1ich interes t 
h i m, we may describe the remaininr pa rts of th e Proces s of 
dee 1 s ion- mak i n.iz i:hich our rational entreprenE'ur would follow . 
To eac~ possible course of ac tion ~e may assume that the 
en t repreneur formulates an estimate of ~ probability distri -
but i on of profits , or l osses . Thus , for example , he would· 
estimate a probabil i ty distributjon of profits or losses frcm 
f eedinF calves ove r the first period ; and he wculd also 
attach a probability distribution of pr of its or losses from 
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d1scontinuin~ operation of the special i zed feedinv system 
ove r t he sec ond pe ri od , and so on . We may a lso assume that 
h e would attac h an est i mat e of t he probability that his eco-
nomic environment would be suc h that he would choose the se 
re spective c ourses of a ction . Since, accordin~ to the von 
Neumar n- Morr-ens t e rn theorem , the utility of a probab i lity 
di s tribution is equa l t o i ts e x pec t ed ut i l ity , we t herefore 
have a probability d i stribution of expected ou tcomes f o r ea ch 
subopportunity . Thus the e ntrepreneur would c hoose among 
the se accord in~ to t he r e leva nt von Neumann-~orgenst ern uti l -
ity inde x . In our e xampl e , he would thus choose b e t ween 
cattle feedin~ and milk production ; and by the same token he 
would choose b etween the a lte rna tive methods of prod uction. 
In so doin~ , we see tha t he i s simpl y choos i np a set of pos-
sible alternat i ve courses o f ac tion , and not a sin~le c ourse 
of a ction . We c a n a l so see tha t this r e sult i s quite c om-
pa tible wi th the anal ys i s of fl exibility , where the problem 
was to choose the best method of plannin~ inputs when fur -
ther information was expected . In f a ct we may fit the a bove 
analysis into thi s latter anal ysis , sinc e we may re~ard it as 
being s i mply an e xp l a na t i on o f the process whereby the rele -
va nt information is ~athered . 
Befor e end in~ this chapter , i t is r.ecessary to cons i der 
brie fl y the poss i ble pos it i on of another se t of theori es of 
cho i ce in the abov e framework . Th i s s e t is c omnosed of the 
game theore tic ~ode ls which have teen deve l oped by sucl1 
workers us Wo ld , Sava[e and othe r s . 
Th e assumption that the entr~preneur will formulate a 
subjective e stimate of the p robebility d istribution of 
prof its or loss es resulting from follo w in~ a particular 
course of a ction , is v ery broad . For exa~ple , subsumed in it 
a r e the possibilities that the en trepreneur ~ay use a n y one 
or ~roup of a regula r spectrum of es tima ting methods , rang ing 
from the most sophisticated eccnometric methods at the one 
extreme , t o simple intuition or ~uess -work at t h e othe r . 
Thus it would s eem difficult t o r easonably deny this assump -
tion on the p rounds of it being so ~arrow in it s a pplicabil-
ity as t o be v irtual l y us e less i n practice . Howe ver the com-
mon characteristic of the game theore tic rr.odels would seem to 
represent s u ch a denial of t h is assu mption , since they are 
based on the as s umpti o n of a bsolu te uncertainty (8) . 
The tenability o f thi s obj e ction must depend upon the 
view taken with re s pect t o the poss ible ac curacy cf the se 
estimations of the probability distribution . If we t a ke the 
view that the e ntrepreneur simply cannot ~ak e consistently 
accura t e estimations of t he rele v a nt parameters , a lofical 
alternative l s to drop the whole procedure , and simply to 
recognize tha t pert inent ev e nts have occurred, and therefore 
may occur apain . Th ls i s the course t a k e n in t he ~am e t heo -
r e tic models of choice . There ls no as sumption of probabil -
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1ty estimations, and the d ec i sion i s mnde usln~ only the data 
which ha ve bee n observed to occur, ~d the appropria te c ho ice 
crite rion . T o the extent that economic systems are compo sed 
of sets of simultaneous r e lationsh ips, and hence the r elevant 
p a rameters may only b e estimat ed if the pertinent relat i on-
ships are i dent lfied ,
1 
thlo v i ew may seem reasonable . Thus 
it may be supges t e d tho t if these par ame ters can on ly be 
estima ted by the ~ost judi cious use of econometr i c me thods, 
the r e seems little c hance that t he e n t r e preneur , especially 
t he far mer , will ~ake a reasonable estimate on his own . 
To some degree there i s va lidity in this argument, and 
t o this extent we may re~ard these theor i es as a substitute 
for t he above fra mework , in that the various choice crite ri a 
may be used to approximate d i ff erent types of ut i lity func -
tion s . However they do seem to be fundamentally defeatis t in 
their attitude towards probability estimation . This po int, 
togethe r with their pessi mi s tic att i tude on the abilities of 
the human mind , seem suff i c ient to ~ake seem qu ite reasonable 
the su~~est ion tha t this substitut i on should not t ake p l a ce . 
lsee for examp l e Johns ton (36) . 
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V . l' liE DYNAMI C THC.ORY A!\D AG111CU LTU hA L PhODUCTI ON 
I~ t h i s cha pte r Ke wil l fi r s t con s i de r t h e i mpor t ance of 
the dynamic t h e ory of production to t he ec ono~ i cs of aFr i -
cul t ure . We wil l the n cons i de r t he i mpli ca t i o ns o f t h i s 
theor y with r e s p e ct t o a~ricul t ural economi c r esear c h and 
e x t en s i on pro~ra~s. 
A. The Eff ect s o f Uncer t a i n ty on 
Agr icultural Product i on 
We have s e en i~ Chapter I t ha t the co~mon d ia~nost1c 
f eature of dvna~ ic theo r i e s i s that t hey hand l e cho jce under 
uncertai nty . Thu s t h e i mp ortance o f t hese t h e ories t o th e 
e co n om i cs of a~ri cultural produc tl c n d e pend s upon t he e x t ent 
to which unc ertainty e x i sts i n th e ecor.om i c environment o f 
the a~r i cultural e n trepr e neur . I t 1 s v e ry we ll k~own tha t 
t h i s e nvironment i s on e of t he T o ~t uncerta jn of a l l a rea s 
of p r oducti on . Henc~ t he r e i s n o neen here t o d e~onstr1te 
th i s f a ct i n de t a il , and we may a s s ume ary dynam i c t h e ory of 
product i o n t c b e pote ntia lly v e r y i mport8n t t o agricult ure . 
Howe v e r 1t l s quite releva nt t o t~e cor t1ru1 ty o f t he d i scus-
sion t o cons i d e r the e ff ect s c f t his uncertain envlrc nment on 
agricultura l pro du c tion . 
Pe rhaps t h e rr o st i ~ nor~ant ( ~h) ceu ~es o f uncer t a l r ty i n 
a griculture ~re price fluc tuat1o~s , wh ic~ a r i s e a s t he e f fect 
of t he i n t e r 3c t1 c n b e t we en a n i nela st i c de~and a nd v a riable 
• ' • ~ ... ' • , • • ~ • '"1 - ~ 
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pr oduct i on coeffici ents caused b y v ar i a ti on s i n wea ther , 
d i seas e eff ects , and so on . Th e re a r e nume rous examples 
where thls po i nt has been demonst r a t ed . ?or example , Br own 
and Hea dy (4) attributed most i mporta nce to price fluctua -
t i o n s 1n c a using i n come va riability i n livestock production . 
This i n come v~riation c a used by f l uct ua t i np price s has vari -
ous i mportant ef f e cts or a~ricultural pr oduction . We may 
classify these e f f e cts i n to thre e broad ~roups : 
(a ) Cauital- ra tior in~ . 
(b) The c ho i ce of production ~e thod s . 
(c) Increas i r.g t he i~portanc e of Tar~~e~ent . 
These g roups a r e not , o f course , cornoletely d i s tinct , 
since fa c tors i n any one ~roup ~ay partia lly dete r mine results 
observe d in e i the r o f t he o ther two . Howev er for t he present 
p urpo s e the y will suff i ce as a rou~h cla ss1fic3 tion of the 
effects of uncerta i n ty . 
1 . Canltal r a tion i nE 
Cap ital rati onin~ i s sa i d to occur when the use o f cap -
ita l i s r e str i cted t o t he extent t ha t i ts value a t t he rear g i n 
is significa nt ly gr eat er t han i ts cost at the mur~1n . Th i s · 
may be broufh t a bout by a r e stri c tion i n sup ply fro~ the 
lend 1n~ firm ( external c apital r a tion 1nF ), o r by a r estrict i on 
i n use b y the borro wer (inte r nal cap i tal rat io~ inf ) (16 , p . 
550). An exaople of the l a tt e r case was provi ded bv a study 
by Hea dy e t a l . ( 20 ), who found t ha t the equity rat i o and th e 
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risk discount f a ctor were slgn1f ica nt i r e xuln i ninp vari -
ation s in ul anned inve stment . They also found that the 
far~ers in the sa~nle were little aff ected by ex t e rnal cap-
ita l r a tionir:p . The rea son for the cbserved int ernal capit al 
r a tion i nP was uncertainty, and pr a ctical ly ull the f a rmers 
were fou nd to describe one hund r ed pf rc en t equity as an ulti -
mate Q:cal. 
2 . The choice of production methods 
quite obviously interral cap ita l rB tior.ir ~ wlll have a 
si~n ificant effect on t te choice of production ae thods . Hox-
ev er , at this point ~e a re more inte r ested in t he e ffect of 
uncertainty on the way in ~hic h a ~i vera a~ount of capital 
will be fixed for productive use , r a t her than how much of it 
will actually be used. 
As an extreme effect of uncertainty on production plans , 
we may cite a study on Kentucky stock f eed i rp- a nd da. iryir.g-
farms made by Nes ius (46 ) . In the ~• rea studied, ther e had 
been fiv e disastrous drou~hts over a period of fif ty years. 
It was shown t hat the f a rms tended to ca r ry cn ly a f ei1 mere 
11 vestock t r.an 1 t W'd S e xpect ed the pastures would c :..i rry in 
dry ye:J.rs . Eowever this extrer:;·e 'c\'ald type maxi - min approach 
see~s to be lliore ch~rncteristic of older and le s s ed ucated 
farm ers (8 , n . 926 ). ~ore usua lly , th e e ffect cf uncerta inty 
on choice of product ion me thods will be tha t "the (fa r ll!e r) 
may pre f er flex ibility to the extent t~ ~ t ~arri nal r a t es o f 
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substitution be t ween ente r pris e s i s sufficient ly grea t er " 
( l?) . Thus , in our curren t t er re inolopy , the f armer usually 
pre fers not to na r r ow do wn his power se t in too rapi d a man-
ner , since this le ~v e s him with t oo l i t tle ~aneuverabili ty in 
t he face of his uncerta i n futur e busine s s environments . For 
similar r ea son s , diversificat i on of p r oduction , a nd the use 
of "sa fe'', "time - p r oved" me thods a r e often pre f e rred (16 , p . 
468). The ne t effect of the se pref erence s is tha t , gene r a lly 
speak ing , the cost structure in a~rlculture wi ll be h i ~her 
than the current t e chnolo~y of the i nd ustry woul d suggest . 
) . The importa nce of mana f ement 
In the previous chapter Ke sa w t ha t t he fund amenta l role 
of t he ent r epreneur in manag ing h i s bu s i ne s s was t o obse rve , 
analyze a nd ma ke decisions i n hi s unce r ta i n business environ-
ment . I n agricul ture , t he ranpe s o f t o t al poss i ble out co~es 
a r e cc ns i der a b l y rrr ea t er t ha n those w !~lch a r e l ike l y t o be 
expe rie nc ed by a ny one en t r epr en eur wo rkir v withi n his own 
n icro- ervironmer: t . Thus 1 t is necessa r y t ha t f areiers shoul d 
ha ve "me nta l capac it i es t o 'thin k o uts i d e ' o f the na rro w 
environme n t of the ir o~n experi er ces " (16 , p . 468), if the y 
a r e to have a ny r ea s cnable cha nce of succes s . ~oreove r they 
must be capable c f c o~ tlnuin~ t his proces s s ft e r a pri~ary 
deci s ion ha s been made , s l r.ce , as we ha ve s ee n acove , t hey 
mus t cc ntir.ua lly l e a rn and adJus~ to t i.e ir char·f! i np envlron-
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ment . Thus we may ~eneralize and sta t e t hat the suc cess ful 
f a r mer wi ll have a n a nalytical approach to h is t a sk of manage-
ment, and hence wi ll use both induct i ve and deduct ive r ea son-
l ng in reochiny his deci s i ons. 
The a bove discuss ion sugges ts tha t "the management f a c -
tor" will be s1~n 1f 1cantly important i n determ ining f arm in-
come . Thu s Wilcox (57 , p . 119) points out that most differ-
ences in net f a r m income ha ve been explained in t erm s of the 
t ec hnical eff lciency of production and marketinrr , and s t r esses 
his belie f tha t vari at ions l n mana~ement are at t he root of 
t he ma tter . S ince we may rerard the above charac teri stics of 
the success ful far~er a s be in~ de fi nitely human c harac toris-
tics, and since t hese latte r phenomena a re 17enerally r.orma lly 
distributed , ~e may r egard the fact t ha t , i n all stud i es on 
i ncome dispersions , the a rray is og i ve (57) , as a possible 
support of t h i s hypothesis. 
B. The I mpl ica tions of the Dyna;nic 'l'heor i es 
f or Agricultura l Economics 
We have seen above that the eeneral eff ect of t he uncer-
t ainty i n the arricultural ec onore ic environment i s that costs 
of production wi ll invariably be si~niflcantly h l~her than 
they woul d be under cond itions of wore nearly perfect know-
ledge . Thus an important rol e of agricultural e conomic re-
search ls tc e limi na te this unce rtainty a s much as the e co -
nom l c use o f na tional r esourc es will al low, since any si~-
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n1f1cant a ch i even:entE made in this direct i on a re bound to 
yiel d lonP--run benefi ts t o both the a~ricultural sec tor and 
t he economy as a who l e . 
Of course a r.ricultura l eco nomic and extension work han 
always been d irected t o this end . However, as was recognized 
in Chapter II, t his work has renerally been carri ed out with-
out t he gu i dance of a theory of production wh ich had , as a 
fundamental part incorporated within i t , a theory of decis1on-
making under incomplete knowled~e . The i nitial discu~sion in 
Chapter II showed tha t one i mmedia t e effect of admitting un-
cer t a inty into the domain of the theory of production wa s the 
loss of the corr espondence between profits and utility. Thus 
was lost almost all of the obj ectivity possible under the 
assumpt ion of perfect knowledge , where the axiom of profi t 
maximization was quite t enable. Consequently i t became nec es-
sary to d i scuss how a pa rticular entrepreneur might ~aximize 
h i s uti lity , g iven h1s own, subj ective, preference ordering , 
and his current po~er set . This l ast requlre~ent mi ght , at 
first vi ew , seem to c arry with it enormous problems for ex-
t ension and r e s earch work , due to the seeming loss of the 
general applicability of research f1nd1np;s , wh ich a re invari -
a bly obtained vi a the assumption of profit maximizat i on . 
However this does r.o t a t all seen to be the ca se , s ince all 
t hat seems necessa ry i s a s light shift in emphas is in r e -
s earch , ar.d a fe w chanr es in the method of pr esenta tion of 
• 
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t he results . 
Usually f arrr. sys t em and enterpri se r es earch r esult s a r e 
published and commur. ica t ed in t he form of avera~e s. The more 
soph i s ti ca t ed the r epor t, the more dat a wi ll be i ncluded on 
t he dispersion, ske wness , and othe r ch aracterist i c s o f the 
sample studied. Prom t he dat a fa ther ed i r. these studies , t he 
i mportan t economi c v ariables are f ound , and r ecommendat ions 
made. However , i n the ligh t of our d i scuss i on i n Chap ter I V, 
we may cr itici ze a l arge number of res earch r eport s on t wo 
i mportant points : 
(1) Invariably no att empt i s made to formulat~ an 
ob jective probability distribution of prof its. 
( 2 ) The stud~' 1 s made , and r ecom!llenda tions given , under 
the as sumption that t he farmers s tudi ed were attempt-
ing t o ma x i mize profits . 
This i s not b~ any means to su~ge st t ~at t he major i ty 
of wo rkers are una ware of the ne ed t o r cco~nize these po int s . 
Inva riably they rr ay be well awar e of such shortcom i ngs in 
their work, but , in t he a bsence of a we ll established dynamic 
theory of pr oduc tion ; and i n the presence of overwhelm in~ 
c omputational a nd statistica l difficul t i es with l i mit ed in-
forcation , they fe e 1 tl1at t h i s is all t hat c an be done with 
exis tin~ t ool s . Th is view ls ent i r e l y r easor.able espec ially 
with r espect t o t he second poin t . Howe ver so ls the a bove 
critici sm of such wo r k i n t he contex t of the present dis -
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cuss i on , where we ~ re simply g ivinr recorn1t1on to t he i m-
pl i c a t i ons of the dynamic t he or i es of produc tion , for a~ri­
cultural e conomics . 
The intersta t e study (34) renerally c onfirmed the use -
fullness o f Johnsor. and Haver•s (35) class ifica ti on o f the 
sta tes of knowled~e i n which a farmer fi nds himself duriny 
the decision- making proces s . Thus, whether or r.ot the ex-
planation of the p rocess developed frcm Koopmans' a pproach 
is accepted , it is obv i ous that i nformat ion on the proba b i l-
ity distribution of profits and losses will be an i ffiportant 
aid to the far~er in t h is moveme nt fro~ subjective uncer-
tairty to subj e ctive c e rta inty. If th e a bove ~xplanation ls 
a c cepted , i nvestigations of the differen t courses of act ion 
wh ich c or.s titut e the respe ctive subopportun1t1es will become 
of r elevan ce. The se would th er. provide a fra~ework o f pos -
sible outcome s ~h ich could be present ed t c the f arncr , a nd 
from wh ich he would choose accordiny t c his prefere~ce. How-
ever, it mav not ce ne ce s sary to d e scribe in detail each pos-
s i ble c 0urse of a ction and its proba b ility d i s tribution of 
outcomes , since it see~ s that it may be possible to us e pro-
gramming methods to ccnsider t he proble~ a s a who l e . We will 
now ~ove t c the final chapter with this objective in ~ind . 
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VI . A MtTHOD FOR CO~PARI NG TWO ALTE&IATIVE 
SYSTcMS OF PiiODUCTI ON 
In t h i s chapter an attempt will be mad e to n ee t t he su~-
~e st lons put forward in the last chap~er . Tha t is to say , a 
p o ssible method f o r comparin~ the like l y profitabilit i es of 
t wo alt e r nat ive methods of product ion ~~11 be describ ed . 
S ince we have see n that an i mportant effect of uncertain ty 
i n a~ricultural production is to c a use a h i~her industrial 
cost structure than present t echnolofy wou l d allow und er more 
c er t a i n conditior.s, ~e will choose to d evelop a theoretical 
framework for cooparinv specialized and flexibl e sy ste~ s of 
productlo~ , since by definition , the for1e r systems ~ill be 
more technolo~ ically effic i en t tha n the l a tter. 
First of all we must consider furth e r the mean i ng of 
" spec iali za ti on" a nd "f l c xi bil 1 ty" . In Cha pter III we saw 
that fl exibility l s a pro pe rty of a business plan . This 
property wa s a ttributed t o a fix ed pla nt whic h wa s ~ot de -
signed t o produce s Flven ou t p u t in th e ~o s t efficient ~an-
ner µoss l ble , ~iven the amount of capita l a vailable , and 
present technolo~v ; but wh ich was des l pn ed to approxima te 
the most efficie n t plants over a ran~e of outputs . Thus we 
may r eFard the de~ree of flexlbilit v exhibi t e d by a g iven 
plant as be1np d irectly pro n ortlor.al t c t he si ze of t his 
ran~e . Hence we may re~ard fl exibility a s bein~ a reasonably 
continuously va riable propert y , and therefore there wil l be 
- ---- - -. . . . . . .. . . ~ ...... "". . . ~ 
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no abso l ute d l st i r.ction between the t wo properti es . Thus a 
s pecial i zed p l ant is essent i a l ly only special i zed relative to 
s ome other plant wh ich will have a greater ranfe of outputs 
over which i t approxima tes best t e chnolo~ i e s . This distinc-
tion should be borne in mind during t he followinr exposit i on . 
In the previous chapter it was suggested t hat there were 
t wo importan t criticisms whi ch should be met by system and 
ent er p r ise r esearch methods . These were, that importance 
should be gi ven ·to determin i ng obj ective probability distri-
buti ons o f profits ; and that the assumption of profit max-
i mi zat i on i s not really tenable. Thus any r e sea rch method 
developed. here should be able t o lli€ et the se criticisms to 
some rea s cnable de~ree . It we s a lso recofnized that the 
second cri t ici sm would be the mos t difficult to meet direct -
l y . Henc e the procedure followed will be t o first describe a 
method i n w~ ich profit maxim i zation is assumed, in order to 
simpli f y the exposition . This method will then be e xpanded 
i n an att empt t o ~eet t he se cond criticism. 
I n Chapter I V i t was shown that we could regard a choice 
of a part i cular course of a ct i on over time, as the r e sult of 
a seri es of c ho i ces wh i ch successively na rrowed down the 
opportuni t i es associa ted with a particular llne of invest-
ment . However, at the bcg1nn 1n~ of each production period, 
Ke saw tha t ther e ~ould essentially be a r ecurrinr set of 
possib l e acti v i t i es in wh i c h l t was possibl e to become 
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en~aged over that per iod . Tha t l s t o say , the financial r e -
sult s o f the previ ous periods would t end ~ore to limi t che 
level of the se act i v iti es , r a t her t han to cause t he exclusion 
of any o f them from subsequ en t pos sible sets from wh ich 
choice c ould be zade . To r e t urn to the example g i ven i n 
Fipure 6 on page 55, suppose the subopportuni ty, "adapt t he 
barn to cattle f eeding " were chosen, and the necessary invest -
ment made. With the ba rn so adapt ed , a t t he beginning of 
each producti on period, i t may still be used to fee d calves 
or steers. Howe ver t he success or failure of the f arm sys tem 
as a whole wil l deter mine t he level at whi ch e i t he r of these 
activiti es may be operated . 
Due t o thi s r e cur ring set of a ctivities associa t ed with 
each suboppor tunity , or l i ne of inves t ment ; and since ~e are 
currently mak i np the a ssumption of profit max i mi zat i on , the 
problerr. of est i~at ing the p robability d i str i bution o f prof its 
associa t ed wit h a pa rticular f a r 1t sys te1·1 ma y read1 l y be 
t a ckled us i ng 1 i nea r prol2'r amm i np- methods . i~ e must compa re 
f arm systems , rather than enterprises, s i nce a s ls Kell 
known, the bas ic profit maxi mi zat ion probl em i nvolves the 
best use of the s carce r e sources of the f a r m, and hence the 
ha rmonious comb i r.a tion of the var ious ente rpr i ses wh ich may 
utilize these r esourc es. Of course the s pecial i zed f arm 
system woul d be bu i lt around o ne i ffipor t anc en t ernrise , and 
of cour.se may s i mply consist of only one Pnterpr l se . However 
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1n this l atter ca se, we are s i mp l y sayiru that t he level s of 
all othe r ent e rpri ses , wh ich cculd cake use of the sca rce r e -
sources of the f arx , are set at zero . It is quite co n c e iv-
able t ha t circumstances could arise where the profit max i-
m1z1n~ c ombina tion of these acti vities wculd actually require 
the le vel of this spe cial ized enterpri se to be set at ze r o , 
and t he snecialize d equipment left i dle . Thus for examp le, 
1f a farm system wa s built around a cattle feedlot sys tem, 
where a max i mum a mount of co r n Ka s r rown to f eed the c a ttle . 
It would be quit e p o s sible for the f a t c a ttle and c or n prices 
to var y in such a way that it was mor e prof itable to sell al l 
the corn, and feed no ca ttle , thus leavln2 t he spe cial i zed 
fe edlot equipment i d l e . 
We have seen above tha t an esser.tial r e qui re ment of o ur 
method i s tha t it r e c orn lzes t~e d epende~c e of the pre sent 
p ower se t on th e outcomes of pa s t undertak i ngs . In Chanter 
II we reco~ni zed t he f easible s e t of the l ine a r pro~ramming 
method ') S def1~ i n~ a po~er set . Thus we ~ust r equi re t hat 
t h e model used to c ompa re t he perf or manc e o f t wo systems o ver 
time , contain a ~e thod for simulat1n~ the adjustments in r e -
straints which would b e necessary a t t he end of e a ch produc-
tion perlod . 1 In thi s mann er, v·e may re~ard t he r equirement 
lTh i s is t he procedure used by L. F. Apecai le, in hi s 
work on h i s doctor ' s t hesis, and who su~~ested the method to 
the present wri t e r. 
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as being reasona bly satisfi ed , and oay oroceed with the gen-
eral description . 
If we define any variable which varies in a chance , or 
unpredictable manner , a s a random variable , it i s qu it e 
obvious that africultural commodity prices most certainly 
qualify to be called random variable s . Since ne t far~ in-
comes a r e functions of t hese prices , we can see that net farm 
income is itself a random variable. Hence , by taking samples 
f r om the various series of observed aFricultural pr oduct 
prices , and us i nf t heffi with the simula t ed linear nrogramo in~ 
model, we may @·enera te a sa~ple of net f a rm i nc ome s which 
will have been genera t ed by scme paren t d istribution which 
is pe culia r to the system and price expecta tior. ~ode l under 
considerat i on . The longe r the series which may be used , the 
more inforffia tlon w111 be availa ble on this d i stribution , and 
the bet t er the e stima t e ~hich may be ~ade of it . By pro-
gramm ing d i fferent f arm systeos , sarrple s from diffe r ent prob-
abi lity distributions wi ll be renerated , and consequently com-
parison may be made between the~ . As ~111 be r e cognized 
below i n the deta iled descri ption of tile method , it may not 
be r ea sonable to atte~pt soph i st ica t ed statistica l compa r isons . 
However it will e t l e3st be possible t o co~pare estima t es of 
such pa rameters a s the mean , ranfe , variance , mod e a nd so on . 
Thus the procedure used f or e stim~tin~ t he probability 
d is tribution of profits for a particular system (say , for 
7) 
exaople, the s ysterr centered on t he spec i a li zed f eed l o t ) 
would be as follows : A set of r esource restraints ar;d a ctiv -
ities would b e d efined, according to t he a rea ard cla ss of 
f arms to wh ich t he results were t o be appl i e d. Obv iously 
the greate r t h e number of far~s wh ich would be characterized 
by the defined set of restrain ts a nd i npu t - Lu t put coeffi -
cients , the g rea ter would t end to ce t he a pplica bility of 
the r e sults . The simplifying assumpt i on of cons tant 1nput-
output coeffici e nts c ould be made if t he pe riod o f sample was 
short , or if th e i ndica tions ~ere th3t such an assumpt ion 
would be tenable . Tc simplify the exr-os ition , we will as sume 
that it is tenable . 
Having so de fin ed the f a rm a t t he beginning of th e 
period , it would then be assumed tha t the f a rmer would use 
these reso urces to s et up the sys t em under con sideration . 
Th i s wo u ld then si mulate the cho i ce of a s ubopportunity, and 
narrow dow~ the power se t , by the n e cessar y adjustment i n the 
restrictions . Thus , for example , by makin~ a heavy invest-
ment in spe ciali zed feedlot equipment, the f a rme r would lower 
t h e affiount of c auital a t his disposal f o r o t h e r uses . This 
effect is illustr~ t ed in the v e ry simplif i ed dia~ram in 
Fi~ure 7. The f a rmer is then r e garded os plann1ne his pro-
f r arr. of out~uts for t he first oeriod cf productlon , a c cordlng 
to some orice expecta tion model , and t he n impleme ntinv th i s 
plan for that first perlod . The ac t ual result of that p lan 
/:\ Dollar 
quantity 
Of hO!ZS 
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~an~t3l r estraint 
of . say $20 ,000 (1) 
Cap ital 
restra int 
of say 
$10,000 (2) 
·~~~~~~~~~~~~--''--~""--~...___,_~-:Y 
0 Do lla r , q uantity 
of fe eder calves 
Fi ~ure ?. Diagrammatic repr e s e ntation of the narrowing 
of the power set 
Rest r aint (1) r e fl e cts t he c ap ital a vailability before 
· i nvestment in the specia lized f eedlot sys tem . 
Restraint (2) r eflects the c apital a vailabi l i ty afte r 
the investment . 
Thus the narrowin~ down of the power set is , in a sense, 
represented by the sha ded a r ea . 
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would then be evaluated accordlnp t o the prices which ac tu-
ally did occur . For example , sup pose the per i od of sampling 
was 1950- 65 . The farmer 1s r egarded as using his expectation 
model to evalua t e his es timates of product prices for the 
first year , tha t is 1950, and he then der i ves his production 
plan for this year , by linear pro~rammin~ . This ulan is 
assumed put into effect , and its yield ls evaluated according 
t o prices which a ctually materialized during tha t year . 
Given this evaluation, the resource r estrai n ts would be re-
adjusted a c cording t o chanfes 1r inventory and liquid finan-
cial resources . This precess would then be r epea ted for each 
period in the ser i es , so yieldlnr the sample of annual net 
incomes . 
By using different pr ice expectation models for the same 
sys t ern , the method would yield a comparison of the re la ti ve 
effici encies of these diffe rent models . Ilowe ve r it should be 
noted that the assumpt ion tha t the f a rmer correctly antic i-
pates prices for e ach slnfle product ion per iod in turn, would 
not necessa rily yi eld a mea sure of the max imum possible 
profits a ttainable from that system, over the pe riod observed . 
The r €adJustments in the restrairits would t end to prevent 
wide fluctuations in successive production p l ans from bein~ 
very prof itable . Thus we can only compa r e system proba bility 
distributions which involve the sa~ e price expecta t i on mod el. 
Si nce the net incomes genera ted by each syste~ a r e random 
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variable s , so will be these d iff e r e nc e s . Hence an est i mate 
of the probabili ty distribution of these d iffer en ces may be 
obtained .. This would yield a n idea of t he p robability that 
an annual differ e n c e would be ~reater t han or equal t o z e r o , 
as illus t r a t ed in the hypothetica l example shown in Fi f,u r e 8 
on pa ve 78. The above arguments ma y b e illustrat ed alr ebr a -
ical ly a s follows . ? irst we define the follow1nv terms: 
r 1 ,t is the observed net price of the 1th output for 
the tth per i od , 
P7 ,t is the e~pected net price of the 1th o u t put for 
the tth ~eriod , 
x 1 ,t l s the oot im~. out put ( accordln~ to t he expec t ed 
prices) of the 1th product for the tth period . 
Then, if we cons i de r n products , we have 
a s t he net revenue for the t th per i od . Th i s will c onta in the 
r e turn on fi xed a s sets , a nd profit . We have seen t hat p rod-
uct prices must be r ega rded a s r a ndomly d istributed . Theo-
retica l ly this ls so bec a use ~e ca nno t fully expla in the 
p roc e ss of price dete r wl ration, but c a n only p ick out the 
ma~or f a ctors in the ~re cess , and mus t c c n fl r e the e ffe c ts 
o f t he rema i r. i r. p n eterminin~ f a ctors t o a r es idua l t e rm . 
Thus we may writ e : 
• 
F1~ure 8 . A hypothe tica l exam ple of two samples o f 
a nnual n e t l nccmes genera t ed by t~o different 
systems 
0 Ti me in 
production 
per lod s 
Possible time - pa ths of net incomes for two differe~t systems 
·~ Relative 
frequency 
'--~~~~~~~-'-~~-'-~~-'---f-~..__~__.~~-'-~~_._~~~~~? 
0 O, say Range of 
diffe:-ences 
Estimate of the probability distribution of these differences 
\ 
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i = 1, 2 ... n 
wher e we r egard the residuals e i,t and hence the Pi,t as 
be1n~ randomly distributed. 
As a very general r epr e senta tion o f the expectation 
model, we may writ e : 
* Pi ,t = E(P,G) i = 1 , 2 ••• n 
where F would be a matr1x of observa tions on the la~r.ed 
th prices of the i , and other related product prices; a nd G 
would be a ma trix of observations on other f a ctors thour-h t 
relevant t o the pr ocess of determinl~p the 1th price . Ob-
vlous ly P would be randomly distributed , while G may or may 
* not be. Hence we can s ee tha t Fi,t would also be ra~domly 
distributed. Also we have : 
* . * * xi , t = xi(Pl,t ' P2 , t ' ••. Pn , t) i = 1 , 2 ••• n 
Hence xi ,t is a lso r a ndomly distributed . Ther efore we ca n 
see tha t Nt, which is a function o f t wo r a ndom variables , 
will itself be a rancom varia ble ; a~d we note t hat this d is-
tribution depends u~on E, the expectation mode l . 
Given t he structural for~ s cf the above rela tionsh i ps , 
and ass umptions on the d1s tribut1on of the el ,t' by deter-
min lnf" the relevant Jacobians, t he distribution of tit could 
be found. HoweveT the nece ssar y compoundin~ of any as sump-
t lons m~de wculd und oubtedly r ender t hi s procedure i mpr a c-
ticable . Hence it i s felt more r easonable t c propose tha t 
observations on the Nt should be used to estima te this dis-
. . . . . . ....... ~ ~ ...... 
· l 
tr1bution dire ctly. 
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If we define Ni as the ne t income from t h e jth s y stem 
for the tth peri od, then 
would represent the difference in net i n comes fro m t wo d if-
ferent s ystems, wh e re the same expecta tiona l model was us ed. 
By analogous rea sonin~ to tha t us ed a bove , ~e c &n see t hat 
Dt would also be randomly distributed. 
The above pr ocedure would yield a n es tima t e of t he pa r a -
meters of the proba bility d istribution o f a nnua l yi e l ds which 
an effici ent f a r me r f o llowing a profit maximizing p roced ure , 
a nd using a pa rticula r expecta tion ~odel , c 0u ld e xpe ct from 
a particula r sys t em of enterpri s e. In v i e w of t he the oret-
1cal discussions in the earlier cha pters , it is sugge s t ed 
that all these r e sult s b e presented t o f armer s in o rder t hat 
they may make t h e ir o wn subj ective ev a lua tions of the various 
system s and exp e cta tion models s tud i ed. 
Befo re conclud in~ this chapt er, ther e r err.a ins t he t a sk 
of modifyin~ the above me thod, in order that the criticism 
of the non-tenability of the as sump tion o f p r of it maxi m1za-
tion may be met t o some ex tent . The fundamenta l arg ume nt 
a gainst the a bove me thod, which this l a tt e r criticism r a ise s , 
lThe authc r is 1~debted to Dr. W. A. Ful l er fo r h i s 
adyice on this matter . 
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is that th e xi,t var i ab les depend upon this a ssumption in a 
c r ucial manner . Thus the feas ible set o f points in the pro -
~rammin~ nroble r.. , is not a t all determined by any objective 
measure of the risk asso cia t ed with each solution vector . 
Hence the optimum s olution may y i eld net incorr.es wh ich have 
prohibitively hirh variances . By phras i ng the problec in 
thi s ~anner, we ca n see t ha t , t o so~e ext ent, the a bove 
method does meet this second criticism , since it may be ex-
pected t hat t he es timates of th e pa rameters cf the distribu-
tions of N~ , obtained under this assumpt ion, would allow the 
f a rmer to t a ke into account t h i s variability. Also , dow~ward 
biased price expecta tior. models would tend to reduce t he 
effect of the profit maximiza tion assumpt ion. Eowever, the 
f ac t remains t hat it seems unlikely tha t f~rmers a ct accord-
l ne- to this a ssumption. Lenee ~· e will compl ete t his c hapt er 
by describin~ a rr.odif ica ti on of t he a bove ~ethcd , wh ich I ay 
better er.able i t to meet this second criticism. 
The nrocedure sui;rre s t ed ls s l n:ply to defir.e a "ri sk 
r estra int" , which would be included i rto the r e straints de -
fined in t ' e a bove rroblem . Thus f or e ~ch period, t he far~er 
would be r e@:arded as rr.ax i mizl ng net incon·e , subj ect to an 
additional restraint that the VYriance o f t ~ is net inccme , 
sho~ld be l ess t han some specif i ed value . ~e have defined 
Nt such that : 
• • .. • .. • • • -::· ...... -. •,Jt"4.a .. ·- ."«"r'. ·_ . ·... . .\ .. , ~.\ 
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n 
Nt = E x1 , t P1 , t · 
1=1 
Thus , for any g i ven set of val ues f or the xi,t ' i = 1, 2 •. • n, 
a t a time t , we ha ve that : 
Her.ce 
Vari a nce o f Nt = Var .(Nt) = E x1 ,t Var . Pi+ 
2E E x1xj cov .( Pi Pj ) . i <j 
n 
= Var • ( Pi ) + 2 E x j co v • ( Pi P j ) • 
j =i+l 
1 = 1, 2 • • . n 
In o rder tha t t he restra i nt may be made to fi t i nto a 
linear progr amm i ng problem , t he ass umption tha t cov . (PiPj ) = 
o, f or al l 1 r.ot equal to j , i s requi r ed . If tests proved 
t h is t o be t enable , we raay pr oceed with t h i s method . Hence 
we could assume: 
1 = 1, 2 .• . n 
Given est ima t es of t hese vari ances , t he restr ain t added 
t o the pro~ram would be : 
n 
E x i Var . (Pi ) ~ K 
1=1 
where K would be a value re f le c t i np t he wi ll i ngness of the 
f a r me r to i nvolve h i mself i ~ a plan havln~ wi dely variable 
outc omes . 
By add 1 n~ this restrai n t t o t he f i r s t me t hod , and by 
usi n~ va rious levels of K, t here woul d be ~enerated a se t of 
. . . . . . . • - . . •.. ·- . •. ' ·.. . • . : J 
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results which should appr ox ima t ely ffie€t the second criticism. 
In view o f t he e xtremely subj ective na ture of the ut i l i ty 
maximization pr ocess , these re sults would be presented to 
farmers i n a manner which Kould descri be t o t hem as fully as 
po ssible , the estima t ed p robab i lity d i s tributions of n e t in-
c omes of t h e systems c ompar ed . Thus , f or exa~ple , they could 
be presented d i agrammatically as i n Fi gure 8 , w~ ich would 
provide a simp l e co~parison of the vari abi li t y in the l evels 
of n e t i nc ome which the d ifferent systens m i~h t be expected 
t o yield. Given this information , t he far~er n i ~h t then be 
better a ble t c p l an h i s farm i ng system . ~ore over , the re is 
currently a defi n it e trend toKa rds ~renter speciali zation i n 
a~ricultural produ ction . If t h i s raethod could be us ~d to 
obj ectively demonstrate that an eff iciently mana~ed special -
ized f a r mi ng system woul d no t yield such a ~reatly fluctuat -
in~ annual net inc ome a s i s cormonly supposed , i t ~ould aid 
in increasing t he effici ency of avricultural resourc e use , by 
help inp to stren,then this trend toward s special i za tion . 
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VI I . SUMMARY 
In the s e c ond chapter , the theories of produc tion are 
recogn iz ed as de fi r- l ng particular interpr etations of the ~en­
eral t heory of choice . Her.ce they are d i v ided ir:to three 
categories , accordin~ t o the do~ain of the preference order-
inp- on which they a re defined . Thus the fun damental c har a c-
teristics of the sta tic, ri sk-trerd , and dyna mic theories , 
are descri bed and compared , and it i s see r. tha t the a r e a of 
definition of t hese theories increa s e s s s we move from the 
static to t he dynam i c cases . Consequer.tly the l i s t of na t ur al 
e c onomic phenomena which may be exp l a i ned b y econom ic theory , 
is leng thened a s the assumptions on th e degr ee of knowled~e 
is relaxed. Thus ~e see that sta tic theories cannot expl ain 
t he exist ence of pr o fit and the rr.a i r.tenance of s tocks of 
goods . ~ or c a n th ey cont a in any r equir ement for a t heo r y 
of decision- mak i ng . The risk-trend t heori es a re simi l a rly 
unable t o r equire a t heory of de ci sion - mak i ng , but they may 
expla in th e ex i stence of profit and the maintenance c f stocks 
of ~oods in a pr oduction ec onomy . It is the potential abil-
ity of the dynamic theor i es to explain al l these phenomena , 
which ls seer. to cha r a cter i ze their i mportance in the deve l -
opment of e c or.o~ic theor y . 
In the t h i rd chapt e r , th e wo rks o f Tintner , Hart and 
Koopmans a re compounded to develo p a framewo rk f or the 
' . . . - • • • - ~. .. ..... > ........ - ••. , 
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dynamic theory of production . The t heory of decision-makin~ 
is re~arded a s the o ro ces s whereby t he ent r epr eneur, finding 
himself i~ a s itua tion of inadequa t e knowledr-e , chooses to 
gather informat i on or. certain of the elements of his power 
s e t , 1n order that he reay choos e fro~ amcnp them according to 
his von Neuir.ann- Morge: nste rn preference orderin? . ~avlnp- so 
defined its posit ion 1n t he framework , t he deta il ed d i scus-
sion of decision theory is l eft to the followln~ chapter . 
Professor Koopmans' observati on tha t, in a t heory of choice 
over time , choice l s inevitable and present c ho i ces will i n -
f l uence f uture sets of possible choices, l s recognized as 
bein~ r elevant t o t he dynElI!l ic theory of nroduction . The 
works of Ti ntner and Hart a r e then us ed to describe the for-
mal maxim i zation of the von t\eumann- ~.orf"enstern preference 
functi on . 
In Chapter IV , t he effe ct cf uncertainty ls seen to 
cause th e l oss of the one - to-c ne corre s ~ondence between the 
profit max i mi zation and utility :1axim1 z'.lt ion orocesses . Th is 
l s due to the f act tha t such f a c tors as th e c onsequences of 
the failure of a busine s s plan also enter ir.to the uti lity 
function . Unde r condit i ons of perf ect knowled~e these con-
s iderations are i r r ele•Jant , but \':hen lrn owledf:re ls less than 
perf ec t , they t e co1e very relevart in the choice of produc-
tion systems . Anothe r result of uncertainty i s that we must 
re~ard the decision- makinr pr ocess as a sa t i sficlng procedure , 
- J 
86 
since i t may no longer be feas ible to i dentify the utility 
max1m1z1ne elemen t of choice . Thus the decision- making pro-
cess rr.ay be rega rded as a search procedure whereby so~e 
satisfactory l eve l of utility may be rea ched . In pa rt C, 
the discuss ion ls re s tricted to the proc e ss by which a major 
entrepreneurial decision may be made. In this discussion , 
Johnson and Haver ' s classification of the sta tes of knowledge 
which constitute the decision- makinr process , is used in con-
junct ion with work by Koopmans, to d escribe a r a tional pro -
cess of de c1sion-~akinr. Thus the process of choice under 
c onditions of inadequate knowledpe is seen to be character-
i zed by a sequence of choices wh ich na r : ow dew~ the existing 
set of fe a sible choices. 
In Chapter V the eff ect cf t he uncertainty in the agr1-
cul tural e c onomic environmen t i s s een to cause the cost 
structure of the industry at any ~iven time , to be h i fher 
than the sta te of te chnolo~y at tha t time would t e nd to su~­
gest. Hence it is ~cognized that an i~portant role of a~ri­
cultural e c c nomic research l s to elimina t e this uncerta inty 
as much as possitle. The theory of dynamic production de -
scribed in the earlier chapters , indica tes t hat information 
on objective estirrates of t he pro ba bility d i stributions of 
out c omes wh ich may follow va ri ous lines of inves t ment , ~111 
be very r e levant to f armers in a iding them in t he ir decislcn-
makin~. Bence in Chapter VI , a ffie thod is d escribed whereby 
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t he s e pr obabi l i ty di str ibut i ons mi~ht be esti~ated . 
In Chapter VI , it is r ecoyn 1zed that the annual net i n-
comes y i e l ded by the use o f a par ti cular price expec tat i on 
mod e l a nd f a r m system over a pericd of time , ~ 11 1 be dis -
tributed i n a r andom manner . From the d i scussions i n the 
prior chapters , i t l s s hown that a procedur e us i ng l i near 
prof"'r amn: 1nf and a model whi ch would simulat e cha nrres i n re -
s ou r ce re s tra i~ts brought abou t by the cutcome s of pr evious 
pr oductior. plans , may be used to genera te a sarepl e of obs er -
vations f r om this distribut i on of net incomes . Thus a pro-
cess i s descr ibed , by wh i ch con:parisons "lay be made of the 
cha r ac ter i s tics of the distri but ions of net i r.comes y i elded 
by d i ff e r ent µr i ce expectat .i on mode l s ar:d f a ru: sys t ems . 
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